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Abstract
Communities are an important feature of social networks. The goal of this paper
is to propose a mathematical model to study the community structure in social
networks. For this, we consider a particular case of a social network, namely
information networks. We assume that there is a population of agents who are
interested in obtaining content. Agents differ in the type of content they are in-
terested in. The goal of agents is to form communities in order to maximize their
utility for obtaining and producing content. We use this model to characterize
the structure of communities that emerge as a Nash equilibrium in this setting.
The work presented in this paper generalizes results in the literature that were ob-
tained for the case of a continuous agent model, to the case of a discrete agent
population model. We note that a discrete agent set reflects more accurately real-
life information networks, and are needed in order to get additional insights into
the community structure, such as for example the connectivity (graph structure)
within in a community, as well as information dissemination within a community.
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider a particular type of social network, which we refer to as an information
network, where agents (individuals) share/exchange information. Sharing/exchanging of informa-
tion is an important aspect of social networks, both for social networks that we form in our everyday
lives, as well as for online social networks such as Twitter.
The work in [1, 2] presents a model to study communities in information networks where agents
produce (generate) content, and consume (obtain) content. Furthermore, the model allows agents to
form communities in order to share/exchange content more efficiently, where agents obtain a certain
utility for joining a given community. Using a game-theoretic framework, [1, 2] characterizes the
community structures that emerge in information networks as Nash equilibria. More precisely, [1, 2]
considers a particular family of community structures, and shows that (under suitable assumptions)
there always exists a community structure that is a Nash equilibrium.
An interesting outcome of the analysis in [1, 2] is that, albeit being very simple, the model in [1, 2]
indeed is able to provide interesting insights into the microscopic structure of information commu-
nities. For example, the characterization of how content is being produced, i.e. which content each
agent in a community produces, indeed matches what has been experimentally observed in real-life
social networks.
However, the analysis in [1, 2] was based on a simplified agent model, i.e. it considered the limiting
case of a very dense agent population. As a result, rather then having a discrete set of agent, the
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agent population was given by a continuous agent density. This assumption simplifies the analysis,
and provides the right insights regarding the structure of communities that emerge in an information
network. However, the model has its limitations. In particular, as the agent population is given by
a continuous density, it does not lend itself readily to study additional properties of communities in
information networks such as for example the dynamics of how information communities form, as
well as the network (graph) structure within an information community.
In this paper we address this issue by considering a discrete agent population model, i.e. a model
whether the information network consists of a finite set of agents. As such, the model considered
captures more accurately the situation of actual information networks that do consists of a finite set
of agents. We then extend the analysis in [1, 2] to the discrete agent population model, and show
that the results in [1, 2] can also be established for the discrete agent model. In particular, the results
in [1, 2] are recovered for the limiting case where the size of agent population approaches infinity.
In summary, the contribution of the paper is a technical contribution in that we extend the result
in [1, 2] that were obtained for a continuous agent model to the case of a discrete agent population
model. While the analysis shares some similarities with the one in [1, 2], and we use some of the
results in [1, 2] for our analysis, the extension to the case of a discrete agent population is technically
quite involved and non-trivial. We also note that the discrete agent case is an important case as it
more accurately reflects real-life information networks. In addition, results for this case are needed
in order to study additional questions such as for example the connectivity (graph structure) within in
a community, as well as information dissemination within a community. Indeed, the motivation for
this paper was that we wanted to study these questions, and the results of [1, 2] were not applicable
to this case.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss existing work that is most
closely related to the model and analysis presented in this paper. In Section 3 and Section 4 we define
the mathematical model that we use for our analysis. In Section 6 we present our main results, and in
Section 7 we discuss the insights obtained from the presented model and analysis, as well as future
research. Due to space constraints, all the proofs are given in the appendix.
2 Related Work
As our work builds on earlier work presented in [1, 2], the summary of related work in [1, 2] also
applies to this paper. For the reader’s convenient, we provide here the overview as well.
There exists extensive work, both experimental and theoretical, on the macroscopic properties of so-
cial network graphs such as the small world phenomena, shrinking diameter, and power-law degree
distribution. By now there are several mathematical models that describe well these properties; ex-
amples of such models are Kroenecker graphs [9] and geometric protean graphs [3]. The difference
between this body of work and the model presented here is that these models on the social network
graph a) do not explicitly model and analyze community structures, and b) focus on macroscopic
properties of the social network graph rather than microscopic properties of communities in social
networks.
There is also a large body of work on community detection algorithms (see for example [6] for a
survey) includingminimum-cutmethods, hierarchical clustering, Givran-Newman algorithm,modu-
lartiy maximization, spectral clustering, and many more. In this paper we are not so much concerned
with detecting communities (clusters) in a social network (complex graph), but with modeling and
characterizing the community structure that emerges in an information network. An interesting ap-
proach to community detection is taken in [5] by Chen et al. who use a game-theorectic approach
to detect overlapping communities in social networks. In [5] it is assumed that there already exists
an underlying social graph for the social network, and the utility that agents obtain when joining a
community depends on a) which other agents joined the community and b) the underlying social
graph. This is different from the approach in this paper where the utility depends on content produc-
tion and consumption. In addition, the goal of the work in [5] is to develop an algorithm to detect
overlapping communities, whereas in this paper we aim at characterizing the microscopic structure
of information communities.
Related to the analysis in this paper is the work on content forwarding and filtering in social net-
works [4, 7, 8]. In particular the work by Zadeh, Goel and Munagala [4], and the work by Hegde,
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Massoulie, and Viennot [8]. In [4], Zadeh, Goel and Munagala consider the problem of information
diffusion in social networks under a broadcast model where content forwarded (posted) by a user is
seen by all its neighbors (followers, friends) in the social graph. For this model, the paper [4] studies
whether there exists a network structure and filtering strategy that leads to both high recall and high
precision. High recall means that all users receive all the content that they are interested in, and
high precision means that all users only receive content they are interested in. The main result in [4]
shows that this is indeed the case under suitable graphmodels such as for example Kronecker graphs.
In [8], Hegde, Massoulie, and Viennot study the problem where users are interested in obtaining
content on specific topics, and study whether there exists a graph structure and filtering strategy that
allows users to obtain all the content they are interested in. Using a game-theoretic framework (flow
games), the analysis in [8] shows that under suitable assumptions there exists a Nash equilibrium,
and selfish dynamics converge to a Nash equilibrium. The main difference between the model and
analysis in [4, 8] and the approach in this paper is that model and analysis in [4, 8] does not explic-
itly consider and model community structures, and the utility obtained by users under the models
in [4, 8] depends only on the content that agents receive, but not on the content agents produce.
The work by Gupta et al. [7] does take into account how content forwarding (re-posting) by a user
affects the utility of neighbors (followers, friends), and studies how different filtering strategies af-
fect content dissemination. The main result in [7] shows that under suitable social graph models
(random graph models) content propagation exhibits a threshold behavior: “high-quality” content
spreads throughout the network whereas “low-quality” content does not. Again, this work does not
explicitly consider and model community structures. Despite these differences, we believe that the
analysis and results presented in [4, 7, 8] are very relevant to the model and results presented in this
paper, and can potentially be used to extend our results presented here to study content filtering and
distribution. Doing this extension is interesting future research.
There exists an interesting connection between the modeling assumption made by Zadeh, Goel and
Munagala in [4] and by Hegde, Massoulie, and Viennot in [8], and a result obtained in [1, 2] and in
this paper (Proposition 1, Section 4.2). Both papers [4, 8] make the modeling assumption that users
produce content only on a small subset of content that they are interested in receiving. Zadeh, Goel
and Munagala support this assumption in [4] through experimental results obtained on Twitter data
that shows that Twitter users indeed tend to produce content on a narrower set of topics than they
consume. The results presented in [1, 2] and in this paper provide a formal validation/explanation for
this assumption as it shows that under the proposed model it is optimal for agents (users) to produce
content on a small subset of the content type that they are interested in consuming. This result
illustrates that the proposed model is able to capture and explain important microscopic properties
of information networks and communities.
3 Mathematical Model
In this section we introduce the mathematical model that we use for our analysis. The model is an
extension of the model in [1, 2] to the case of a discrete agent population. We first present the model
for the content that agents can produce in an information community. We assume that each content
item that is being produced belongs to a particular content type. One might think of a content type as
a topic, or particular interest that agents have. Furthermore, we assume that there exists a structure
that relates the different content types with each other. In particular, we assume that there exists a
measure of “closeness” between content types that characterizes how strongly related two content
types are. For example “basketball” and “baseball” are both sports and one would assume that these
two topics are stronger related with each other than for example “basketball” and “mathematics”.
More formally, we assume that the type of a content item is given by a point x in a metric space
M. The assumption that content types lie in a metric space allows for a natural way to compare the
closeness between content types. In particular, the distance between two content types x, y ∈ M is
then given by the distance measure d(x, y), x, y ∈ M, of the metric spaceM.
We next model the content that a given agent is interested in. The model is based on the following
intuition. We assume that agents have a main interest, i.e. for each agent there exists a content type
x ∈ M that they are most interested in. Moreover, agents are interested in more than one content
type, i.e. agents are not only interested in getting information for their main interest x ∈M but also
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other type of content. However, the further away a given content type is from their center of interest,
the less interested they are in this content type.
To model this situation, we associate with each agent that consumes content a center of interest
y ∈ M. The center of interest of a given agent is the content type (topic) that an agent is most
interested in. Given the center of interest y ∈ M of an agent, the interest of agent y in content of
type x ∈ M is then given by
p(x|y) = f(d(x, y)),
where d(x, y) is the distance between the center of interest y and the content type x, and f :
[0,∞) 7→ [0, 1] is a non-increasing function. The interpretation of the function p(x|y) is as fol-
lows: when agent y reads a content of type x, then it finds it interesting with probability p(x|y)
given by
p(x|y) = f(d(x, y)).
As the function f is non-increasing, this model captures the intuition that agent an y ∈ M is more
interested in content that is close to its center of interest y.
We will refer in the following to an agent by its center of interest y ∈ M, i.e. when we refer to an
agent y ∈ M we refer to the agent whose center of interest is equal to y.
Next consider a given agent that is producing content, and let y ∈ M be the center of interest of the
agent. The ability of agent y to produce content of type x ∈M is then given by
q(x|y) = g(d(x, y)),
where g : [0,∞) 7→ [0, 1] is a non-increasing function. The interpretation of this function is as
follows. If agent y produces content of type x, then the content will be relevant to content type x
with probability q(x|y) given by
q(x|y) = g(d(x, y)).
As the function g is non-increasing, this model captures the intuition that agent an y ∈ M is better
at producing content that is close to its center of interest y.
For our analysis, we make additional assumptions on the functions f and g that we use to define the
functions p(·|y) and q(·|y). To state these assumptions, we introduce a few more definitions.
Throughout the paper, we use the following notation. Given a real-valued function f : M 7→ R on
a metric spaceM, we define the support supp(f) by
supp(f) = A¯
where
A = {x ∈M|f(x) 6= 0},
and A¯ is the closure of A.
Given real-valued function f : M 7→ R on a metric space M, we say that f is symmetric with
respect to y ∈M if for x, x′ ∈M such that
d(x, y) = d(x′, y),
we have that
f(x) = f(x′).
Using these definitions, we make the following assumptions for the function f and g.
Assumption 1. The function f : [0, L] 7→ [0, 1] is strictly decreasing and three times continuously
differentiable on [0, L], the first three derivatives are bounded first derivative on [0, L], and we have
that
f ′(0) < 0.
Furthermore, the function f is locally strictly concave, i.e. there exists a constant b, 0 < b ≤ L,
such that
f ′′(x) < 0, x ∈ [0, b].
The function g : [0, L] 7→ [0, 1] is non-increasing on [0, L], and strictly concave and twice continu-
ously differentiable on its support supp(g) with
g(0) > 0
and
g′(0) = 0.
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These assumptions on the functions f and g are a technical assumptions used in the proofs of our
results.
3.1 Content Space R
In addition, we consider for our analysis a metric space that has a particular structure. More pre-
cisely, we consider a one dimensional metric space with the torus metric. The reason for using this
structure is that it simplifies the analysis and allows us to obtain simple expressions for our results,
that can easily been interpreted.
More formally, we consider in the following one-dimensional metric space for our analysis. The
metric space is given by an interval R = [−L,L) ∈ R, 0 < L, with the torus metric, i.e. the
distance between two points x, y ∈ R is given by
d(x, y) = ||x− y|| = min{|x− y|, 2L− |x− y|},
where |x| is the absolute value of x ∈ (−∞,∞).
Note that we have that
||x− y|| ≤ L, x, y ∈ R.
Furthermore, we have the following two properties,
1. for x, y ∈ R, the addition of x and y is given by
x+ y =
{
x+ y, x+ y ∈ [−L,L).
−2L+ x+ y, x+ y ≥ L.
2L+ x+ y, x+ y < −L.
2. we have that
x < y, x, y ∈ R.
if there exists a point b, b ∈ (0, L), such that
x = y − b.
Using the torus metric for the content spaceR eliminates “border effects”, in the sense are no points
that have a “special” position as it would be for example the case if we would an interval [−L,L] as
the content space. This simplifies the analysis, and leads to simpler expressions for our results.
4 Agent Population Model
We assume that there exists a finite number of agents that exclusively produce content, as well as
a finite number of agents that exclusively consume content. More precisely, the set of agents that
consume content is given by finite set A(d) ⊂ R, of K(d), K(d) ≥ 2, agents that consume content,
and a set A(s) ⊂ R, ofK(s),K(s) ≥ 1, agents that produce content. The subscript d in Cd refers to
“demand”, and the subscript s in Cs refers to “supply”. For our analysis, we assume that the agents
that consume content are “uniformly distributed” at distance δd,
δd =
2L
K(d)
,
overR, and we denote this set of agents byA(d). More precisely, the setA(d) of agents that consume
content is given by
A(d) = A(d) = {y1, ..., yK(d)}
such that
yk+1 = yk + δd, k = 1, ...,K
(d) − 1.
Similarly, we assume that the agents that produce content are “uniformly distributed” at distance δs,
δs =
2L
K(s)
,
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overR, and we denote this set of agents byA(s). More precisely, the setA(s) of agents that produce
content is given by
A(s) = A(s) = {y1, ..., yK(s)}
such that
yk+1 = yk + δs, k = 1, ...,K
(d) − 1.
While we consider here the case where there exists a set of content producers, and a set content
consumers, the results in this paper can easily be extended to the case where each agent both pro-
duces and consumes content. The results obtained in this paper also hold for this case, requiring
only notational changes in the proofs.
4.1 Information Community
Having defined the set A(d) of agents that consume content, and the set A(s) of agents that produce
content, we model a information community as follows. An information communityCδ = (Cd, Cs)
is defined by the set Cd ⊆ A(d) of agents that consume content in the community Cδ , and the set
Cs ⊆ A(s) of agents that produce content in the community Cδ .
For a given a community Cδ = (Cd, Cs), we assume that each agent y ∈ Cs can decide how much
effort it puts into producing content of type x. We model this situation as follows. We let βCδ(x|y),
x ∈ R, be the rate at which agent y produces content of type x in community Cδ where βCδ(·|y) is
a non-negative function, i.e. for y ∈ Cs we have that
βCδ (x|y) ≥ 0, x ∈ R.
The total rate (over all agents y ∈ Cs) at which content of type x is generated in the community Cδ
is then given by
βCδ (x) =
∑
y∈Cs
βCδ (x|y).
Recall that content of type x that is generated by agent y ∈ Cs is relevant to x with probability
q(x|y), and that total rate (over all agents y ∈ Cs) at which relevant content is generated in C is
equal to
QCδ(x) =
∑
y∈Cs
βCδ (x|y)q(x|y).
We refer to QCδ(x) as the content supply function of the community Cδ .
For the content consumption we assume that each y ∈ Cd can decide on the fraction of time it
allocates to consume content that is being produced in communityCδ . Let αCδ (y), 0 ≤ αCδ (y) ≤ 1,
be the fraction of time with which agent y ∈ Cd consumes content in community Cδ , and let the
function PCδ (x) be given by
PCδ(x) =
∑
y∈Cd
αCδ(y)p(x|y).
We refer to PCδ (x) as the content demand function of community Cδ .
For the reward and cost for consuming content, we make the following assumptions. Agents pay a
cost c for consuming a content item, where c is a processing cost that reflects the effort/time required
by an agent to process (read) a content item (and decide whether it is of interest or not). If the content
item is of interest, then the agent receives a reward equal to 1; otherwise the agent receives a reward
equal to 0. The rate µC(x|y) at which an agent y ∈ Cs receives content of type x in community Cδ
that is of interest to agent y is then given by
µCδ(x|y) = αCδ(y)
∑
z∈Cs
βCδ(x|z)q(x|z)p(x|y)
= αCδ(y)QCδ(x)p(x|y).
The rate at which agent y reads content of type x in the community C is given by
αCδ(y)βCδ (x).
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As agent y pays a cost of c for each content item, the cost rate that is incurred on agent y is
αCδ(y)βCδ (x).
Combining the above results, the (time-average) utility rate (“reward minus cost”) for content con-
sumption U
(d)
Cδ
(y) of agent y ∈ Cd in community Cδ is given by
U
(d)
Cδ
(y) = αCδ(y)
∫
R
[
QCδ (x)p(x|y) − βCδ(x)c
]
dx.
The (time-average) utility rate for content production U
(s)
Cδ
(y) of agent y ∈ Cs in community Cδ is
given by
U
(s)
Cδ
(y) =
∫
R
βCδ(x|y)
∑
z∈Cd
αCδ(z)
[
q(x|y)p(x|z) − c
]
dx
=
∫
R
βCδ(x|y)
[
q(x|y)PCδ (x)− αCδc
]
dx.
where
αCδ =
∑
y∈Cd
αCδ (y).
This utility rate has the following interpretation. Note that [q(x|y)p(x|z)− c] is the expected reward
that agent z ∈ Cd receives from content of type x that is being produced by agent y ∈ Cs. Therefore
in an economic setting [q(x|y)p(x|z) − c] is the amount (price) that agent z is willing to pay agent
y for obtaining from agent y content of type x. In this sense, one interpretation of the utility rate of
a content producer y ∈ Cs is that it reflects the revenue that y would obtain for the content that y
produces in the community Cδ. An alternative interpretation, and the one we adopt in this paper, is
that the utility rate of content producer y ∈ Cs reflects the reputation, or “reputation score”, of agent
y in the community Cδ , i.e. it captures how beneficial the contributions of a content producer y are
for the community Cδ .
4.2 Community Structure
In the previous section we introduced the model of a community in an information network, and
characterized the utility rates that agents obtain when consuming and producing content in a given
community. Next, we consider the situation where there are agents form several communities in
an information network. In particular, we define for this situation how agents decide on how to
produce and consume content in the different communities. We refer to the set of communities in an
information network, combined with the characterization of how agents decide on how to produce
and consume content in the different communities, as a community structure in an information
network.
More precisely, a community structure in an information network is given by a triplet S =(
C, {αC(y)}y∈A(d) , {βC(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
where C is a set of communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs) as defined
in the previous section, and
αC(y) = {αCδ (y)}Cδ∈C and βC(y) = {βCδ(·|y)}Cδ∈C
indicate the rates that content consumers and producers allocate to the different communities Cδ ∈
C.
In the following require that each agent is part of at least one community in a community structure.
We refer to such a community structure as a covering community structures. More formally, we
assume that each agent y ∈ A(d), y ∈ A(s) belong to at least one community Cδ ∈ C, and we have
that
∪Cδ∈CCd = A
(d)
and
∪Cδ∈CCs = A
(s).
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Furthermore, we assume that the total content consumption and production rates of each agent can
not exceed a given threshold, and we have that
||αC(y)|| =
∑
Cδ∈C
αCδ(y) ≤ Ep, y ∈ A
(d),
where
0 < Ep ≤ 1,
and
||βC(y)|| =
∑
Cδ∈C
||βCδ(·|y)|| ≤ Eq, y ∈ A
(s),
where
||βCδ (·|y)|| =
∫
x∈R
βC(x|y)dx
and
0 < Eq.
Finally, we require that for a given community structure
(
C, {αC(y)}y∈A(d) , {βC(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
, we
have for Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C that
αCδ (y) > 0, y ∈ Cd,
and
||βCδ(y)|| > 0, y ∈ Cs,
i.e. each agent y ∈ Cd has a positive content consumption rate αCδ(y) in community C, and each
agent y ∈ Cs has a positive total content production rate ||βCδ(y)|| in community Cδ .
4.3 ǫ−Equilibrium
Having defined a community structure in an information network, we next consider the situation
where agents consume and produce content in the different communities in order to maximize their
utility rates. For this situation we use a game-theoretic approach to characterize the community
structures that emerge in an information network. In particular, we characterize the community
structure that emerges using the concept of an approximate Nash equilibrium, or a ǫ−equilibrium.
To do that, we describe how agents decide on how to consume and produce content in the different
communities in order to maximize their utility rates.
Given a community structure S =
(
C, {αC(y)}y∈A(d) , {βC(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
, let U
(d)
Sδ
(y), y ∈ A(d), the
be the total utility rate (over all communities) that agent y receives under this community structure.
More precisely, let U
(d)
Sδ
(y), y ∈ A(d), be given by
U
(d)
Sδ
(y) =
∑
Cδ∈C
U
(d)
Cδ
(y) =
∑
Cδ∈C
αCδ (y)
∫
R
[
QCδ(x)p(x|y) − βCδ (x)c
]
dx
where
QCδ(x) =
∑
y∈Cs
βCδ (x|y)q(x|y),
and
βCδ (x) =
∑
y∈Cs
βCδ (x|y).
Similarly, let U
(s)
Sδ
(y), y ∈ A(s), the be the total utility rate (over all communities) that agent y
receives under this community structure. More precisely, let U
(s)
Sδ
(y), y ∈ A(s), be given by
U
(s)
Sδ
(y) =
∑
Cδ∈C
U
(s)
Cδ
(y) =
∑
Cδ∈C
∫
R
βCδ(z|y)
[
q(x|y)PCδ (x) − αCδc
]
dx
where
PCδ (x) =
∑
y∈Cs
αCδ (y)p(x|y),
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and
αCδ =
∑
y∈Cs
αCδ(y).
Using these definitions, we analyze for a given a community structure S the situation where an agent
y ∈ A(d) changes its rate allocation from αC(y) to αC′(y) given by
αC
′(y) = {αCδ
′(y)}Cδ∈C
such that ∑
Cδ∈C
αCδ
′(y) ≤ Ep.
More precisely, letU
(d)
Sδ
(αC
′(y)|y) be the utility that agent y ∈ A(d) obtains under the new allocation
αC
′(y) (while all other agents keep their rate allocation fixed) given by
U
(d)
Sδ
(αC
′(y)|y) =
∑
Cδ∈C
αCδ
′(y)
∫
x∈M
[∑
z∈Cs
βCδ(x|z)
[
q(x|z)p(x|y)− c
]]
dx.
Similarly, given a community structure S we analyze the situation where an agent y ∈ A(s) changes
its rate allocation βC(y) to βC
′(y) given by
βC
′(y) = {βCδ
′(·|y)}Cδ∈C ,
such that
||βC
′(y)|| ≤ Eq.
Let U
(s)
Sδ
(βC
′(y)|y) be the utility rate that agent y receives under the new allocation βC
′(y) (while
all other agents keep their rate allocation fixed) given by
U
(s)
Sδ
(βC
′(y)|y) =
∑
Cδ∈C
∫
x∈M
βCδ
′(x|y)
[∑
z∈Cd
αCδ (y)
[
q(x|y)p(x|z) − c
]]
dx.
Given a community structure S =
(
C, {αC(y)}y∈A(d) , {βC(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
, ideally agents want to
choose allocations for consuming and producing content in order to maximize their utility rates.
Here we use a slightly weaker criteria of an approximate Nash equilibrium, or a ǫ−equilibrium ,
where agents change their current allocations only if the new allocations provides an increase in
their utility rate at least by a factor ǫ, ǫ > 0.
More formally, we call a community structure
S∗ =
(
C, {α∗C(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
a ǫ−equilibrium if
a) for all agents y ∈ A(d) we have that
U
(d)
S∗
δ
(αC(y)|y)− U
(d)
S∗
δ
(y) < ǫ,
where αC(y) = argmaxαC′(y):||αC′(y)||≤Ep U
(d)
S∗
δ
(αC
′(y)|y),
b) for all agents y ∈ A(s) we have that
U
(s)
S∗
δ
(βC(y)|y)− U
(s)
S∗
δ
(y) < ǫ,
where βC(y) = argmaxβC′(y):||βC′(y)||≤Eq U
(s)
S∗
δ
(βC
′(y)|y).
In the following we study whether there exists a ǫ−equilibrium , and characterize the community
structure of a ǫ−equilibrium. For our analysis we consider a particular metric space, and agent
population model, that we describe in the next subsection.
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5 Discrete Interval Community and Community Structure Cδ(LC)
For our analysis of an ǫ−equilibrium , we focus on a particular class of community structures, to
which we refer as a discrete interval community structureC(LC, δ). In this section, we formally
introduce this class of community structures.
5.1 Discrete Interval Community
To formally define a discrete interval community structure C(LC , δ), we use the following defini-
tions. Given an interval IC inR, let
|IC | =
∫
IC
dy
be the length of the interval, let
LC =
|IC |
2
be the half-length of the interval IC , and let
mid(IC) =
1
IC
∫
IC
zdy
be the midpoint of the interval IC . Note that when IC is a closed interval then we have that
IC = [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC) + LC ].
Given an interval IC inR with half-length LC and midpointmid(IC), a discrete set Cδ on IC with
distance δ, δ > 0, is then given by a set Cδ ,
Cδ = {y1, ..., yK},
such that
a) K ≥ 2,
b) yk+1 − yk = δ, k = 1, ...,K − 1, or
yk+1 = yk + δ, k = 1, ...,K − 1,
c) ||y1 − (mid(IC)− LC)|| ≤ δ, and
d) ||yK − (mid(IC) + LC)|| ≤ δ.
Note that this definition implies that the K points in Cδ are evenly spread out over the interval IC
with distance δ between neighboring points. Furthermore, we have that the endpoints y1 and yK
in Cδ are at a distance of at most δ from the endpointsmid(IC) − LC and mid(IC) + LC of the
interval IC .
Note that given an interval IC ⊂ R, and the set of agents A(d) and A(s) that consume and produce
content, respectively, we have that
Cd = A
(d) ∩ IC
is a discrete set on IC with distance δd, and
Cs = A
(s) ∩ IC
is a discrete set on IC with distance δs.
Given an interval IC onR and a discrete set
Cδ = {y1, ..., yK}
on IC with distance δ, the midpointmid(Cδ) of Cδ is given by
mid(Cδ) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
yk =
1
K
∑
y∈Cδ
y =
y1 + yK
2
.
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Furthermore, the half-length L(Cδ) of the discrete set Cδ is given by
L(Cδ) =
yK − y1
2
,
and we have that
y1 = mid(Cδ)− L(Cδ)
and
yK = mid(Cδ) + L(Cδ).
Finally, note that we have that
L(Cδ) ≤ LC
and
|L(Cδ)− LC | ≤ δ.
Using the definition of an discrete interval set, we define a discrete interval community as follows.
Given an interval IC onR, a discrete interval community on IC with distance δ, δ > 0, is then given
by a community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) such that both sets Cd and Cs are discrete sets on IC with distance
smaller than δ.
In the following, we say that a community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) is a discrete interval community with
distance δ, if there exists a interval IC onR such thatCδ = (Cd, Cs) is a discrete interval community
on IC with distance δ.
Similarly, we say that a community structure
(
C, {αC(y)}y∈A(d) , {βC(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
is a discrete in-
terval community structure with distance δ if every community in Cδ ∈ C is an interval community
with distance δ.
Finally, we say that a ǫ−equilibrium
(
C, {α∗C(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
is a discrete interval
ǫ−equilibrium with distance δ if
(
C, {α∗C(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
is a discrete interval com-
munity with distance δ.
5.2 Community Structure Cδ(LC)
Using the above notation, we define the class Cδ(LC) of discrete interval community structures with
distance δ as follows.
Definition 1. Let LC be such that
0 < 2LC < min{b, L},
where b is the constant of Assumption 1. The class Cδ(LC) then consists of all community structures(
C, {αC(y)}y∈A(d) , {βC(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
where
C = {Cδ,k}k=1,...,K
that are defined on a set of agentsA(d) with distance δd such that
0 < δd < δ,
and set of agentsA(s) with distance δs such that
0 < δs < δ,
and have the following properties.
There exists set a {ICk}k=1,...,K of mutually non-overlapping intervals in R of length 2LC , i.e. we
have that
1) ICk ∩ ICk′ = ∅, k 6= k
′,
2) ∪k=1,..,KICk = R,
3) |ICk | = 2LC , k = 1, ..,K ,
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such that the community Cδ,k = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C = {Cδ,k}k=1,...,K , is given by
Cd = A
(d) ∩ ICk
and
Cs = A
(s) ∩ ICk .
Furthermore, for Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C = {Cδ,k}k=1,...,K we have that
a) αCδ(y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd, and
b) βCδ(x|y) = Eqδ(x
∗
δ(y)− x), y ∈ Cs, x ∈ R, where
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
[q(x|y)PCδ (x)] = argmax
x∈R

q(x|y)Ep ∑
y∈Cd
p(x|y)


and δ(·) is the Dirac delta function.
Note that each community structure
S =
(
C, {αC(y)}y∈A(d) , {βC(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
∈ Cδ(LC)
consists of a set of discrete interval communities on an interval of equal length of 2LC . Furthermore,
we have that each agent y ∈ A(d), and each agent y ∈ A(s), belongs to exactly one community in
C. Finally, given a community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C, each agent y ∈ Cd allocates all its effort to
consume content in the community C, and each each y ∈ Cs allocates all its effort to produces
content of type x∗δ(y).
In the next section, we show that there always exists a class Cδ(LC) of discrete interval community
structures with distance δ such that all community structures S ∈ Cδ(LC) are a ǫ−equilibrium.
6 Results
In this section we present the main results of our analysis. The proofs for the results are given in the
appendix.
Our first results shows that there always exists a ǫ−equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Suppose that
f(0)g(0)− c > 0,
then there exists a LC ,
0 < 2LC < min{b, L},
where b is the constant of Assumption 1, such that the following is true. For every ǫ > 0 there exists
a δ > 0 such that all discrete interval community structures S∗ ∈ Cδ(LC) are a ǫ−equilibrium.
Proposition 1 states that there always exists a ǫ−equilibrium S∗ given that distance δd, and δs, of
the agents sets A(d), and A(s), are small enough, i.e. we have that δd, δs < δ, where δ is as given in
the statement of Proposition 1.
The result of Proposition 1 that a ǫ−equilibrium consists of discrete interval communities captures
that intuition that the content that is being produced and a consumed in a community should be
“aligned” in the sense that the content producers in the community should have a high ability to
produce content that the content consumers in the community are most interested in.
Furthermore, from the definition of the class Cδ(LC)we have that under a Nash equilibrium as given
in Proposition 1 each content producer y ∈ Cs in a given community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) focuses on
producing a single type of content given by
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x).
This result is interesting as experimental results suggest that this property indeed holds in real-life
information networks. We will discuss this in more details in Section 7.
In the following we characterize in more details the properties of a ǫ−equilibrium as given by Propo-
sition 1.
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6.1 Optimal Content Type x∗δ(y)
Proposition 1 states that under a discrete interval ǫ−equilibrium as given in Proposition 1, each agent
y ∈ A(s) produces a single type of content. More precisely, if Cδ = (Cd, Cs) is a community in a
discrete interval ǫ−equilibrium S∗ as given by Proposition 1, then we have for y ∈ Cs that
βCδ (x|y) = Eqδ(x
∗
δ(y)− x), x ∈ R,
where
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x).
In this subsection we characterize in more details the function x∗δ(y) for a given community Cδ =
(Cd, Cs) in a ǫ−equilibrium. In particular, we have the following result.
Proposition 2. Let Cδ(LC) be a class of discrete interval community structures with distance
δ as given by Proposition 1, i.e. we have that all community structures S∗ ∈ Cδ(LC) are a
ǫ−equilibrium. Then for every ∆x∗ , 0 < ∆x∗ < LC , there exists a class Cδ0(LC) ⊆ Cδ(LC),
0 < δ0 ≤ δ, of discrete interval community structures with distance δ0 such that for all community
structures (
C, {α∗C(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
∈ Cδ0(LC)
the following is true. Given a community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C, let the interval IC = [mid(IC) −
LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R as given in Proposition 1, i.e. we have that
Cd = A
(d) ∩ IC and Cs = A
(s) ∩ IC .
Then the solution x∗δ(y) to the optimization problem
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x), y ∈ IC ,
where
PCδ (x) = Ep
∑
y∈Cd
p(x|y),
has the properties that
(a) there exists a unique optimal solution x∗δ(y) for y ∈ IC .
(b) for y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆x∗ ], we have that
x∗δ(y) ∈ (y,mid(IC)) ∩ supp(q(·|y)).
(c) for y ∈ [mid(IC) + ∆x∗ ,mid(IC) + LC ], we have that
x∗δ(y) ∈ (mid(IC), y) ∩ supp(q(·|y)).
(d) the function x∗δ(y) is strictly increasing and differentiable on
[mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆x∗ ] ∪ [mid(IC) + ∆x∗ ,mid(IC) + LC ].
Proposition 2 states that the function x∗δ(y) is strictly increasing on IC\(mid(IC)−∆x∗ ,mid(IC)+
∆x∗). This result implies that two different agents y, y
′ ∈ IC\(mid(IC)−∆x∗ ,mid(IC) + ∆x∗),
y 6= y′, produce different type of contents, i.e. we have that
x∗δ(y) 6= x
∗
δ(y
′), y 6= y′, y, y′ ∈ IC\(mid(IC)−∆x∗ ,mid(IC) + ∆x∗).
This result is interesting as it states that under each agent y in IC\(mid(IC)−∆x∗ ,mid(IC)+∆x∗)
produces a unique content type x∗δ(y), i.e. we have that the content type x
∗
δ(y) is not produced by
any other agent in IC\(mid(IC)−∆x∗ ,mid(IC) + ∆x∗).
Another interesting aspect of Proposition 2 is that the function x∗δ(y) has the property that
x∗δ(y) ∈ (y,mid(IC)) ∩ supp(q(·|y))
and
x∗δ(y) ∈ (mid(IC), y) ∩ supp(q(·|y)).
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This result states that agents y ∈ IC\(mid(IC) − ∆x∗ ,mid(IC) + ∆x∗) produce content that is
closer to the center of interestmid(IC) of the community C than their center of interest y. To get a
more detailed understanding of how agents adapt the type of content that they produce towards the
center of interestmid(IC) of the community Cδ , we next study the function∆
∗
δ(y) given by
∆∗δ(y) = ||y − x
∗
δ(y)||, y ∈ IC .
The function ∆∗δ(y) characterizes the absolute value of the “displacement” of the optimal content
x∗δ(y) that agent y produces, and content y that the agent is best at producing which is equal to
content type y. Or in other words, the function∆∗δ(y) characterizes by how much an agent y adapts
its content x∗δ(y) towards the center of interest of the community Cδ , i.e. by how much agent y
produces content x∗δ(y) that is closer to the center of interest mid(IC) of the community than its
own center of interest.
In addition, the function∆∗δ(y) can be used to characterize the quality of the optimal content x
∗
δ(y)
that agent y produces as we have that
q(x∗δ(y)|y) = g(||y − x
∗
δ(y)||) = g(∆
∗
δ(y)).
We have the following result for the function∆∗δ(y).
Proposition 3. Let Cδ(LC) be a class of discrete interval community structures with distance
δ as given by Proposition 1, i.e. we have that all community structures S∗ ∈ Cδ(LC) are a
ǫ−equilibrium. Then for every ∆x∗ , 0 < ∆x∗ < LC , there exists a class Cδ0(LC) ⊆ Cδ(LC),
0 < δ0 ≤ δ, of discrete interval community structures with distance δ0 such that for all community
structures (
C, {α∗C(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
∈ Cδ0(LC)
the following is true. Given a community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C, let the interval IC = [mid(IC) −
LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R as given in Proposition 1, i.e. we have that
Cd = A
(d) ∩ IC and Cs = A
(s) ∩ IC .
Then the function∆∗δ(y) given by
∆∗δ(y) = ||y − x
∗
δ(y)||, y ∈ IC ,
where
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x),
is strictly decreasing and differentiable on [mid(IC)−LC,mid(IC)−∆x∗ ], and strictly increasing
and differentiable on [mid(IC) + ∆x∗ ,mid(IC)] + LC ].
Proposition 3 states that the function∆∗δ(y) is strictly decreasing and differentiable on [mid(IC)−
LC ,mid(IC)−∆x∗ ], and strictly increasing and differentiable on [mid(IC)+∆x∗ ,mid(IC)]+LC ].
This implies that the further away an agent is from the center of interest mid(IC), the more it will
“adapt” the content it produces towards to the center mid(IC) of the interval IC , i.e. the larger
∆∗δ(y) will be. In addition, this result implies that the further away an agent is from the center of
interest mid(IC), the lower the quality is the content that the agents produces. To see this, recall
that by Assumption 1, g is decreasing on supp(g) and we have that the quality of the content that
agent y produces is given by
q(x∗δ(y)|y) = g(||y − x
∗
δ(y)||) = g(∆
∗
δ(y)).
We discuss the results of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 in more details in Section 7.
6.2 Properties of the Content Demand Function PCδ(x)
We next characterize the properties of the content demand function PCδ(x) of a discrete interval
community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) under a discrete interval ǫ−equilibrium as given in Proposition 1. We
have the following result.
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Proposition 4. Let Cδ(LC) be a class of discrete interval community structures with distance
δ as given by Proposition 1, i.e. we have that all community structures S∗ ∈ Cδ(LC) are a
ǫ−equilibrium. Then for every ∆P , 0 < ∆P < LC , there exists a class Cδ0(LC) ⊆ Cδ(LC),
0 < δ0 ≤ δ, of discrete interval community structures with distance δ0 such that for all community
structures (
C, {α∗C(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
∈ Cδ0(LC)
the following is true. Given a community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C, let the interval IC = [mid(IC) −
LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R as given in Proposition 1, i.e. we have that
Cd = A
(d) ∩ IC and Cs = A
(s) ∩ IC .
Then the demand function
PCδ (x) =
∑
y∈Iδ,C
α∗Cδ (y)p(x|y) = Ep
∑
y∈Iδ,C
p(x|y), x ∈ R,
has the properties that
(a) PCδ (x) is symmetric with respect tomid(Cd).
(b) PCδ (x) is strictly increasing on the interval [mid(IC)−LC ,mid(IC)−∆P ], and strictly
decreasing on the interval [mid(IC) + ∆P ,mid(IC) + LC).
(c) PCδ (x) is strictly concave in x on the interval IC .
Note that Proposition 4 implies that
argmax
x∈R
PCδ (x) ∈ [mid(IC)−∆P ,mid(IC) + ∆P ],
i.e. the most popular content is close to the center of interest of the community Cδ . Furthermore,
we have that the further away a content type x is from the center of interest of the community, the
less popular it is.
6.3 Properties of the Content Supply Function Q∗Cδ(x)
Next characterize the properties of the content demand function Q∗Cδ(x) of a discrete interval com-
munity Cδ = (Cd, Cs) under a discrete interval ǫ−equilibrium as given in Proposition 1. We have
the following result.
Proposition 5. Let Cδ(LC) be a class of discrete interval community structures with distance
δ as given by Proposition 1, i.e. we have that all community structures S∗ ∈ Cδ(LC) are a
ǫ−equilibrium. Then there exists a class Cδ0(LC) ⊆ Cδ(LC), 0 < δ0 ≤ δ, of discrete interval
community structures with distance δ0 such that for all community structures(
C, {α∗C(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
∈ Cδ0(LC)
the following is true. Given a community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C, let the interval IC = [mid(IC) −
LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R as given in Proposition 1, i.e. we have that
Cd = A
(d) ∩ IC and intsd = A
(s) ∩ IC .
Then the content supply functionQ∗Cδ(x), x ∈ R, is given by
Q∗Cδ(x) = Eq
∑
y∈Cs
δ
(
x− x∗δ(y))q(x
∗
δ(y)|y
)
where x∗δ(y) = argmaxx∈R q(x|y)PCδ (x), and δ(·) is the Dirac delta function, and we have that
supp(Q∗Cδ(·)) ⊆ [mid(IC)− L
∗
Cδ
,mid(IC) + L
∗
Cδ
]
where 0 < L∗Cδ < LC .
Proposition 5 states that
supp(Q∗Cδ(·)) ⊆ [mid(IC)− L
∗
Cδ
,mid(IC) + L
∗
Cδ
]
where 0 < L∗Cδ < LC . This result implies that the content type that is being produced by agents in
the community Cδ is a strict subset of the interval IC . As a result, there is no overlap in the content
produced in different communities under a discrete interval ǫ−equilibrium as given by Proposition 1.
We discuss this results in more details in Section 7.
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6.4 Properties of the Utility Function U
(d)
Cδ
(y) and U
(s)
Cδ
(y)
Finally, we study the properties of the utility rate function for content consumptionU
(d)
Cδ
(y), and the
utility rate function for content production U
(s)
Cδ
(y) for an interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) under
a discrete interval ǫ−equilibrium as given by Proposition 1.
We first study the properties of the utility rates for content consumption U
(d)
Cδ
(y) for an interval
community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) under a discrete interval ǫ−equilibrium as given by Proposition 1.
Proposition 6. Let Cδ(LC) be a class of discrete interval community structures with distance δ
as given by Proposition 1, i.e. i.e. we have that all community structures S∗ ∈ Cδ(LC) are a
ǫ−equilibrium. Then for every ∆U , 0 < ∆U < LC , there exists a class Cδ0(LC) ⊆ Cδ(LC),
0 < δ0 ≤ δ, of discrete interval community structures with distance δ0 such that for all community
structures (
C, {α∗C(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
∈ Cδ0(LC)
the following is true. Given a community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C, let the interval IC = [mid(IC) −
LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R as given in Proposition 1, i.e. we have that
Cd = A
(d) ∩ IC and Cs = A
(s) ∩ IC .
Then the utility rate function for content consumption U
(d)
Cδ
(y) given by
U
(d)
Cδ
(y) = EpEq
∑
z∈Cs
[
p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x
∗
δ(z)|z)− c
]
dx, y ∈ Cd,
where
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x),
has the following properties.
a) For
y, y′ ∈ Cd ∩ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆U ],
such that y > y′, we have that U
(d)
Cδ
(y) > U
(d)
Cδ
(y′).
b) For
y, y′ ∈ Cd ∩ [mid(IC) + ∆U ,mid(IC) + LC ],
such that y < y′, we have that U
(d)
Cδ
(y) > U
(d)
Cδ
(y′).
Proposition 6 states that the closer an agent y ∈ Cd is to the center of interest of the community, the
higher a higher utility rate it receives. This is an interesting result as it suggest that the utility rate
might can be used to rank agents in an information community. We discuss this in more details in
Section 7.
We next study the properties of the utility rates for content productionU
(s)
Cδ
(y) for an discrete interval
community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) under a discrete interval ǫ−equilibrium as given by Proposition 1.
Proposition 7. Let Cδ(LC) be a class of discrete interval community structures with distance
δ as given by Proposition 1, i.e. we have that all community structures S∗ ∈ Cδ(LC) are a
ǫ−equilibrium. Then for every ∆U , 0 < ∆U < LC , there exists a class Cδ0(LC) ⊆ Cδ(LC),
0 < δ0 ≤ δ, of discrete interval community structures with distance δ0 such that for all community
structures (
C, {α∗C(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
∈ Cδ0(LC)
the following is true. Given a community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C, let the interval IC = [mid(IC) −
LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R as given in Proposition 1, i.e. we have that
Cd = A
(d) ∩ IC and Cs = A
(s) ∩ IC .
Then the utility rate function for content production U
(s)
Cδ
(y) given by
U
(s)
Cδ
(y) = EpEq
[
q
(
x∗δ(y)|y
)
PCδ(x
∗
δ(y))− αCδc
]
, y ∈ Cs,
has the following properties.
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a) For
y, y′ ∈ Cd ∩ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆U ],
such that y > y′, we have that U
(s)
Cδ
(y) > U
(s)
Cδ
(y′).
b) For
y, y′ ∈ Cd ∩ [mid(IC) + ∆U ,mid(IC) + LC ],
such that y < y′, we have that U
(s)
Cδ
(y) > U
(s)
Cδ
(y′).
Similar to Proposition 6, Proposition 7 states that the closer an agent y ∈ Cd is to the center of
interest of the community, the higher a higher utility rate it receives. Again, this result suggest that
the utility rate might can be used to rank agents in an information community. We discuss this in
more details in Section 7.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we considered an information network with a discrete set of agents, and characterized
for this model community structures that are a ǫ−equilibrium . The analysis extends the results
of [1, 2] that were obtained for a continuous agent population model to the case of a discrete agent
populationmodel. In particular, in the limiting case of a very dense agents populationA(d) andA(s),
i.e. when the distances δd and δs approach 0, the results presented in this paper recover the results
obtained in [1, 2]. As such, the case of a continuous population model that is easier to analyzed and
characterize provides the right intuition for the discrete population model which captures better the
real-life information networks.
An interesting aspect of the results in this paper, and inf [1, 2], is that they indeed provide insights
into properties of communities in real-life information networks. Below we provide an overview of
these properties which are essentially the same as obtained in [1, 2].
Proposition 1 states that each content producer in a community focuses on generating exactly one
type of content, i.e we have that that an agent y ∈ Cs produces the content unique content type
x∗δ(y) given by
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x), y ∈ Cs.
This is an interesting results as this property/behavior has indeed been observed in real-life social
networks. In particular, Zadeh, Goel and Munagala provide experimental results using data obtain
from Twitter that shows Twitter users produce content on a very narrow set of topics, and consume
content on a large set of topics [4]. The interpretation of this experimental result based on the
analysis presented in this paper is that this behavior is indeed optimal, and that the topics for which
a given Twitter user produces content is the optimal content for this user to produce.
Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 state that agents adapt the content they produce towards center of
interest of a community they belong to. This is an interesting result, as it provides insight regarding
the issue of “homophily versus adaption” in social networks. One aspect of communities in social
networks is that members of the community tend to have similar interests, and behave similarly. One
question is whether is due to homophily, i.e. do individuals form a community because they have
the same interest and behave similarly, or whether this is due to adaption, i.e. is due that through the
interaction in a community its members develop similar interests and behave similarly. The results
of this paper suggest that both mechanism are at work in information communities. In particular,
homophily (similar interests) prompts individuals to join the same community. This is captured by
the result of Proposition 2 which states the communities of a ǫ−equilibrium as given in Proposition 1
are given by intervals, and hence the center of interests of agents in a given community belong to the
same interval and are close together. Or in other words, under a ǫ−equilibrium agents that belong
to the same community indeed have similar interests. Moreover, when an content producing agent
joins a community then the agent adapts the content it produces from its center of interest towards
the center of interest of the community. This is captured by the result of Proposition 2 which states
that an agent in community Cδ does not produce content y for which they have the best ability, i.e.
content type that is the center of interest of the agent, but agent y adapts the content type x∗δ(y) that
is produces towards the center of interest of the community.
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Proposition 4 states that the content type that is the most popular is the content type that is close to
the the center of interest of the community. Moreover, it states that the further away a content type
is from the center of interest of a community, the less popular it is in the community. This result is
interesting as it confirms in a formal way the intuition that communities have a “center of interest”,
i.e. there is a focus (center of interest) of the community and the closer a type of content (topic) is
to that center of interest, the more popular (in demand) the content will be. While this property of a
community may seem “intuitively obvious”, it is interesting to observe that this property is indeed
recovered (confirmed) using the proposed model.
Proposition 5 implies that under a ǫ−equilibrium there is no overlap between the content that is
being produced in different communities, i.e. each community produces a distinct set of content
types. This is an interesting result as it suggest that each information community can be identified by
unique “core content” that is only produced in this community. In particular, this result suggests that
each real-life community has a “core interest” that is unique to the community, and hence identifies
this community. Moreover, it seems that this property should be useful when trying to discover
(identify) communities in information networks, i.e. one should be able to exploit this property to
potential design more efficient algorithms to discover communities in information networks. How,
and whether, this is possible is future research.
Finally, Proposition 6 and 7 state that the agents that are close to the center of interest of a community
obtain the highest utility rate for content consumption and production; and the further away an
agent y is from the center of interest of the community, the smaller a utility it will receive. This
result suggest that there is a “natural” way to rank members in a community, where a member is
ranked higher if it receives a higher utility. In particular, if it is possible to observe the utilities that
community members receive, then it is indeed possible to rank community members in this way.
How, and when, it is possible to observe (estimate) utilities that community members receive, and
how this information can be used to design algorithms to analysis information communities, is future
research.
In ongoing research, we use the model and results presented in this paper to study the connectivity
(graph structure) within in a community, as well as information dissemination within a community.
In addition use the model and results presented in this paper to study local social search algorithms
to detect core users in a community, as well as local algorithms to detect information communities.
References
[1] Peter Marbach, The structure of communities in information networks, Information Theory and
Applications (ITA) Workshop, 2016, DOI:10.1109/ITA.2016.7888181
[2] Peter Marbach, Modeling and analysis of information communities,
http://arxiv.org/abs/1511.08904
[3] Anthony Bonato, Jeannette Janssen, and Pawel Pralat. Geometric protean graphs. CoRR,
abs/1111.0207, 2011.
[4] Reza Bosagh Zadeh, Ashish Goel, Kamesh Munagala, and Aneesh Sharma. On the precision of
social and information networks. In Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Online social
networks, pages 63–74. ACM, 2013.
[5] Wei Chen, Zhenming Liu, Xiaorui Sun, and Yajun Wang. A game-theoretic framework to
identify overlapping communities in social networks. Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery,
21(2):224–240, 2010.
[6] Santo Fortunato. Community detection in graphs. Physics Reports, 486(3-5):75 – 174, 2010.
[7] Mangesh Gupte, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Lu Han, Liviu Iftode, Pravin Shankar, and
Raluca M Ursu. News posting by strategic users in a social network. In Internet and Network
Economics, pages 632–639. Springer, 2009.
[8] Nidhi Hegde, LaurentMassoulie´, and Laurent Viennot. Self-organizingflows in social networks.
In Structural Information and Communication Complexity, pages 116–128. Springer, 2013.
[9] Jure Leskovec, Deepayan Chakrabarti, Jon Kleinberg, Christos Faloutsos, and Zoubin Ghahra-
mani. Kronecker graphs: An approach to modeling networks. J. Mach. Learn. Res., 11:985–
1042, March 2010.
18
A Property of Discrete Sets on an Interval IC with Distance δ
In this appendix we derive a result for discrete sets on an interval IC with distance δ which we use
in our analysis. For this, recall the definition of a discrete set on an interval IC with distance δ. In
particular, recall that given an interval IC on R, a discrete set Cδ on IC with distance δ, δ > 0, is
given by
Cδ = {y1, ..., yK} ⊂ IC
such that
a) K ≥ 2,
b) yk+1 − yk = δ, k = 1, ...,K − 1,
c) ||y1 − (mid(IC)− LC)|| ≤ δ,
d) ||yK − (mid(IC) + LC)|| ≤ δ,
wheremid(IC) is the mid-point, and LC is the half-length, of the interval IC .
Given an interval IC onR and a discrete set
Cδ = {y1, ..., yK}
on IC with distance δ, recall that the midpointmid(Cδ) of Cδ is given by
mid(Cδ) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
yk =
1
K
∑
y∈Cδ
y =
y1 + yK
2
.
Furthermore, recall that the half-length L(Cδ) of the discrete set Cδ is given by
L(Cδ) =
yK − y1
2
,
and we have that
y1 = mid(Cδ)− L(Cδ)
and
yK = mid(Cδ) + L(Cδ).
Finally, note that we have that
L(Cδ) ≤ LC
and
|L(Cδ)− LC | ≤ δ.
We then obtain the following result which states that the midpoint mid(Cδ) of the discrete set Cδ
on IC is not too far away from the midpointmid(IC) of the set IC .
Lemma 1. Consider an interval IC ⊂ R. Then for all discrete sets Cδ on IC with distance δ we
have that
||mid(Cδ)−mid(IC)|| ≤ δ.
Proof. Consider a discrete set Cδ on the interval IC with distance δ given by
Iδ,C = {yk}k=1,...,K .
By definition we have that
||y1 − (mid(IC)− LC)|| ≤ δ
and
||yK − (mid(IC) + LC))|| ≤ δ.
This implies that
||mid(Cδ)−mid(IC)|| =
∥∥∥∥y1 + yK2 − mid(LC)− LC +mid(IC) + LC2
∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥y1 − (mid(LC)− LC)2
∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥yK − (mid(LC) + LC)2
∥∥∥∥
≤ δ.
The result then follows.
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B Riemann Sum Approximation
In this appendix we review properties of the Riemann sum approximation of an integral, and apply
them to the demand function PCδ (x) for a discrete interval community C with distance δ.
Given an integral ∫ b
a
f(x)dx, a, b ∈ R,
the Riemann sum approximation of the integral is given by
N∑
n=1
f
(
a+ iδ(N)
)
δ(N),
where N is an integer and
δ(N) =
|a− b|
N
.
We have the following well-known result for the approximation error of the Riemann sum.
Proposition 8. If the function f(x) is differentiable on the interval [a, b] and there exists a constant
M such that
|f ′(x)| ≤M, x ∈ [a, b],
then we have that
lim
N→∞
N∑
n=1
f
(
a+ iδ(N)
)
δ(N) =
∫ b
a
f(x)dx,
and ∣∣∣∣∣
∫ b
a
f(x)dx −
N∑
n=1
f
(
a+ iδ(N)
)
δ(N)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ M |a− b|
2
2N
=
M |a− b|
2
δ(N).
This result states that the smaller δ(N), or the larger the number of points N , the more accurate is
the Riemann sum approximation of a given interval.
We can apply this result to the demand function PCδ(x) for a discrete interval community Cδ with
distance δ as follows. Given an interval IC and a discrete interval communityCδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC
with distance δ, we have that δdPCδ (x) given by
δdPCδ(x) = δd
∑
y∈Cd
αCδ (y)p(x|y), x ∈ R,
can be interpreted as a Riemann sum approximation of the integral
PC(x) =
∫
IC
αC(y)p(x|y)dy.
More precisely, we have the following result for the case where
αCδ(y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd
and
αC(y) = Ep, y ∈ IC .
Lemma 2. Let Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, be a given constant. Furthermore let f be the function in
Assumption 1, and letM be such that
|f ′(x)| < M, x ∈ [0, L].
Given an interval IC ⊂ R and a discrete community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ we have
for δdPCδ (x) given by
δdPCδ(x) = δd
∑
y∈Cd
Epp(x|y), x ∈ R,
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and PC(x), x ∈ R, given by
PC(x) =
∫
IC
Epp(x|y)dy, x ∈ R,
that ∣∣∣δdPCδ (x) − PC(x)∣∣∣ ≤ 2Ep(MLC + 1)δd < 2Ep(MLC + 1)δ
where LC is the half-length of the interval IC .
Proof. By definition we have for a discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance
δ that
δd < δ,
and in order to prove the lemma it suffices to show that∣∣∣δdPCδ(x) − PC(x)∣∣∣ ≤ 2Ep(MLC + 1)δd.
Recall that the set Cd is given by a set ofK points {y1, ..., yK} in the interval IC such that
yk+1 − yk = δd, k = 1, ...,K − 1.
We then have that
δdPCδ (x) = δd
∑
y∈Cd
Epp(x|y), x ∈ R
is the Riemann sum approximation for the integral
PˆC(x) =
∫ yK
y1−δd
Epp(x|y)dy.
From Proposition 8, we then have that
∣∣∣δdPCδ(x) − PˆC(x)∣∣∣ ≤ EpM
(
2L
(
Cd
)
+ δd
)
2
δd (1)
where
L
(
Cd
)
=
yK − y1
2
.
Note that by definition we have that
L
(
Cd
)
≥ δd
and it follows that
2L
(
Cd
)
+ δd ≤ 4L
(
Cd
)
.
Combining this result with Eq. (1), it follows that∣∣∣δdPCδ (x)− PˆC(x)∣∣∣ ≤ 2EpML(Cd)δd.
By definition we have that
y1 − δd ≤ mid(IC)− LC ≤ y1,
and we obtain that
mid(IC)− LC − (y1 − δd) ≤ δd,
Similarly, we have that
yK ≤ mid(IC) + LC ≤ yK + δd,
and we obtain that
mid(IC) + LC − yk ≤ δd.
It then follows that
|PˆC(x)− PC(x)| = Ep
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ mid(IC)−LC
y1−δd
p(x|y)dy
∣∣∣∣∣+ Ep
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ mid(IC)+LC
yK
p(x|y)dy
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
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and
|PˆC(x) − PC(x)| ≤ 2Epδ.
Using the above results, we obtain that
|δdPCδ (x) − PC(x)| ≤
∣∣∣δdPCδ(x) − PˆC(x)∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣PˆC(x) − PC(x)∣∣∣
≤ 2EpML
(
Cd
)
δd + 2Epδd
≤ 2EpMLCδd + 2Epδd
= 2Ep(MLC + 1)δd.
The result of the lemmas then follows.
C Properties of PCδ(x)
In this appendix we derive properties of the demand function PCδ(x) of a discrete interval commu-
nity C with distance δ, and prove Proposition 4.
More precisely, given a discrete interval community community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) with distance δ, we
characterize the demand function PCδ (x) given by
PCδ(x) =
∑
y∈Cd
αCδ(y)p(x|y), x ∈ R.
Recall that for a given discrete set Cδ ,
Cδ = {y1, ..., yK},
on IC with distance δ, we have that
L(Cδ) =
yK − y1
2
and
mid(Cδ) =
y1 + yK
2
.
Finally, recall that the metric spaceR that we use in our analysis is given by an interval [−L,L) ∈ R,
L > 0, with the torus metric.
In the following we will focus on the case where agents allocate all their consumption rate to the
community C, i.e. we have that
αCδ (y) = Ep > 0, y ∈ Cd.
We then have the following two results.
Lemma 3. Consider a constant Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and an interval
IC = [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R.
Then for every ∆P > 0 there exists a δ0(LC) > 0 such that for all discrete interval communities
Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC) we have that∣∣∣Pc(x)− δdPCδ (x)∣∣∣ < ∆P , x ∈ R,
where
PCδ (x) =
∑
y∈Cd
Epp(x|y)
and
PC(x) =
∫
IC
Epp(x|y)dy.
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Proof. By Lemma 2 we have that
|δdPCδ (x)− PC(x)| < 2Ep(MLC + 1)δ
whereM is such that
|f ′(x)| < M, x ∈ [0, L].
The result of the lemma then follows by setting
δ0(LC) <
∆P
2Ep(MLC + 1)
.
Lemma 4. Consider a constant Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and an interval
IC = [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R.
Then for every ∆P , 0 < ∆P < LC , there exists a δ0(LC) > 0 such that for all discrete interval
communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC) the following is true. If we have that
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and
LC <
L
2
,
then the demand function
PCδ (x) =
∑
y∈Cd
αCδ (y)p(x|y) = Ep
∑
y∈Cd
p(x|y), x ∈ R,
has the properties that
(a) PCδ (x) is twice differentiable onR.
(b) PCδ (x) is symmetric with respect tomid(Cd).
(c) PCδ (x) is strictly increasing on the interval [mid(IC) − L,mid(IC) −∆P ], and strictly
decreasing on the interval [mid(IC) + ∆P ,mid(IC) + L).
(d) PCδ (x) is strictly concave in x on the interval [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC) + LC ].
Proof. We first prove part (a) and (b) of the lemma.
The result that PCδ (x) is twice differentiable on R follows directly from Assumption 1 which im-
plies that the function p(x|y) is twice differentiable in x onR.
Under the assumption that
αCδ (y) = Ep > 0, y ∈ Cδ,
the result that PCδ(x) is symmetric around y0 = mid(Cδ) follows by the same argument given
in [2] to proof that the function
PC(x) = Ep
∫
y∈IC
p(x|y)dy
is symmetric aroundmid(IC).
We next consider part (c) of the lemma. If
αC(y) = Ep > 0, y ∈ IC ,
and
LC <
L
2
,
then we have from the analysis in [2] that PC(x) given by
PC(x) = Ep
∫
y∈IC
p(x|y)dy,
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is strictly increasing on the interval [mid(IC)−L,mid(IC)), and strictly decreasing on the interval
(mid(IC),mid(IC) + L). From the analysis in [2], we also have that the derivative of PC(x) is
continuous onR. It then follows that there exists a constant B1 > 0 such that
d
dx
PC(x) > B1, x ∈ [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)−∆P ]
and
d
dx
PC(x) < −B1, x ∈ [mid(IC) + ∆P ,mid(IC) + L).
Furthermore, by Assumption 1, there exists constantsM1 andM2 such that∣∣∣∣ ddxp(x|y)
∣∣∣∣ < M1, x ∈ R, y ∈ IC ,
and ∣∣∣∣ d2d2xp(x|y)
∣∣∣∣ < M2, x ∈ R, y ∈ IC .
By the same argument as given in the proof for Lemma 2, it then follows that∣∣∣∣ ddxPC(x)− δ ddxPCδ (x)
∣∣∣∣ < 2Ep(M2LC +M1)δ.
Let
δ
(1)
0 =
B1
2
·
1
2Ep(M2LC +M1)
.
It then follows that for δ such that
0 < δ < δ
(1)
0 ,
we have that
δ
d
dx
PCδ (x) >
B1
2
> 0, x ∈ [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)−∆P ]
and
δ
d
dx
PCδ (x) < −
B1
2
< 0, x ∈ [mid(IC) + ∆P ,mid(IC) + L).
This result implies that for every discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance
δ < δ
(1)
0 we have that PC(x) is strictly increasing on the interval [mid(IC) − L,mid(IC) −∆P ],
and strictly decreasing on the interval [mid(IC) + ∆P ,mid(IC) + L).
It remains to prove part (d) of the lemma. From the analysis in [2] we have that the function PC(x)
is strictly concave on [mid(IC) − LC ,mid(IC) + LC ], and hence there exists a constant B2 > 0
such that
d2
dx2
PC < −B2, x ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC) + LC ].
By Assumption 1, there exists a constantM3 such that∣∣∣∣ d3d3xp(x|y)
∣∣∣∣ < M3, x, y ∈ IC ,
and by the same argument as given in the proof for Lemma 2 it follows that∣∣∣∣ d2dx2PC(x)− δ d
2
dx2
PCδ (x)
∣∣∣∣ < 2Ep(M3LC +M2)δ.
whereM2 is such that ∣∣∣∣ d2d2xp(x|y)
∣∣∣∣ < M2, x ∈ R, y ∈ IC .
Let
δ
(2)
0 =
B2
2
·
1
2Ep(M3LC +M2)
.
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It then follows that for δ such that
0 < δ < δ
(2)
0 ,
we have that
δ
d2
dx2
Pδ,C(x) < −
B2
2
< 0, x ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC) + LC ].
This result implies that for every discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance
δ < δ
(2)
0 we have thatPCδ (x) is strictly concave in x on the interval [mid(IC)−LC ,mid(IC)+LC ].
The result of the lemma then follows by setting
δ0(LC) = min{δ
(1)
0 , δ
(2)
0 }.
D Proof of Proposition 4
In this appendix we prove Proposition 4 using the results of Appendix C. Recall that Proposition 4
characterizes the content demand function PCδ(x) for a discrete interval communityCδ = (Cd, Cs)
that is part of a ǫ−equilibrium as given by Proposition 1.
We obtain the result of Proposition 4 using the results of Appendix C as follows. Let(
C, {α∗C(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
be a ǫ−equilibrium as given by Proposition 1. Then we have that for every discrete interval commu-
nity Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C that
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and
LC <
L
2
,
where LC is the length of the interval IC such that
Cd = A
(d) ∩ IC .
As a result, the properties of a discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C satisfy the assump-
tions in Lemma 4. Proposition 4 then follows immediately from Lemma 4.
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E Properties of x∗
δ
(y),∆∗
δ
(y) and q(x∗
δ
(y)|y)
In this section, we consider a discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ,
and study the corresponding optimization problem
max
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x), y ∈ IC ,
where
PCδ(x) =
∑
y∈Cd
αCδ(y)p(x|y), x ∈ R.
In particular, we characterize when the above problem has an unique optimal solution x∗δ(y), and
study the function x∗δ(y), y ∈ IC .
Before doing this, we consider in the next subsection an interval community C = (IC , IC) as
defined in [2]. That is, we consider a community C = (Cd, Cs) where the set of content consumers
and content producers is equal to the interval IC ⊂ R, i.e. we have that
Cd = Cs = IC .
For this (continuous) interval community C = (IC , IC), we characterize the function x
∗(y) given
by
x∗(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PC(x), y ∈ IC ,
where
PC(x) = Ep
∫
IC
p(x|y)dy.
We then use these proprieties to characterize the function x∗δ(y), y ∈ IC .
E.1 Properties of x∗(y)
For a given interval community C = (IC , IC), let the function x
∗(y) be given by
x∗(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PC(x), y ∈ IC ,
where
PC(x) = Ep
∫
IC
p(x|y)dy, x ∈ R.
In the following we show that if for a given y ∈ IC we have that the distance
||x∗(y)− x||
is large, then the difference between the values of q(x∗(y)|y)PC(x∗(y)) and q(x|y)PC(x)must also
be large. More precisely, we have the following result.
Lemma 5. Consider a constant Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and an interval community C = (IC , IC) where
IC = [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R is an interval inR. If we have that
αC(y) = Ep > 0, y ∈ IC ,
and
LC <
L
2
,
then the following is true. For every∆x, 0 < ∆x <
L
2 , there exists a ∆Q > 0 such that if
||x∗(y)− x|| ≥ ∆x, x ∈ R, y ∈ IC ,
then we have that ∣∣q(x∗(y)|y)PC(x∗(y))− q(x|y)PC(x)∣∣ ≥ ∆Q,
where
x∗(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PC(x), y ∈ IC ,
and
PC(x) = Ep
∫
IC
p(x|y)dy, x ∈ R.
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Proof. Without loss of generality we assume in the following that the set IC is given by
IC = [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC) + LC ].
From the analysis in [2] we have that the function q(x|y)PC(x) is symmetric with respect to
mid(IC), and it suffices to prove the result for the case where
y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)].
By assumption we have that
αC(y) = Ep > 0, y ∈ IC ,
and
LC <
L
2
.
From the analysis in [2] we then have that the optimization problem
x∗(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PC(x), y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)],
has a unique optimal solution, and
x∗(y) ∈ [y,mid(IC)] ∩ supp(q(·|y)), y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)].
For y ∈ [mid(IC) − LC ,mid(IC)] and ∆x as given in the statement of the lemma, let xl(y,∆x)
and xh(y,∆x) be given by
xl(y,∆x) = x
∗(y)−∆x
and
xh(y,∆x) = x
∗(y) + ∆x.
Note that under the assumption that
0 < ∆x <
L
2
and
LC <
L
2
,
we have that
xl(y,∆x) ∈ (mid(IC)− L, x
∗(y))
and
xh(y,∆x) ∈ (x
∗(y),mid(IC) + L).
From the analysis in [2], we have that the function x∗(y) is continuous in y on [mid(IC) −
LC ,mid(IC)], and it follows that the functions xl(y,∆x) and xh(y,∆x) are continuous in y on
[mid(IC) − LC ,mid(IC)]. Furthermore, the functions xl(y,∆x) and xh(y,∆x) are continuous in
∆x on [0, L/2) with
lim
∆x→0
xl(y,∆x) = lim
∆x→0
xh(y,∆x) = x
∗(y), y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)].
Using the functions xl(y,∆x) and xh(y,∆x) that we defined above, let the functions Fl(y,∆x) and
Fh(y,∆x) be given by
Fl(y,∆x) = q(x
∗(y)|y)PC(x
∗(y))− q(xl(y,∆x)|y)PC(xl(y,∆x))
and
Fh(y,∆x) = q(x
∗(y)|y)PC(x
∗(y))− q(xh(y,∆x)|y)PC(xh(y,∆x)).
From the analysis in [2] we have that the function
q(x∗(y)|y)PC(x
∗(y)), y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)],
is continuous in y on IC . Combining this result with the properties of the functions xl(y,∆x) and
xh(y,∆x) that we obtained above, it follows that Fl(y,∆x) and Fh(y,∆x) are continuous in y on
[mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)], as well as continuous in ∆x on [0,
L
2 ), with
lim
∆x→0
Fl(y,∆x) = lim
∆x→0
Fh(y,∆x) = 0, y ∈ IC .
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From the analysis in [2] we have that there exists a unique optimal solution x∗(y) for the optimiza-
tion problem
x∗(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PC(x), y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)],
and it follows that for
0 < ∆x <
L
2
we have
Fl(y,∆x) > 0, y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)],
and
Fh(y,∆x) > 0, y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)].
Let the function F (y,∆x) be given by
F (y,∆x) = min
{
Fl(y,∆x), Fh(y,∆x)
}
.
From the above results it follows that for
0 < ∆x <
L
2
we have
F (y,∆x) > 0, y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)]. (2)
Finally, we obtain from the above results that the function F (y,∆x) is continuous in y on
[mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)], as well as continuous in ∆x on [0,
L
2 ), with
lim
∆x→0
F (y,∆x) = 0, y ∈ IC .
Having made the above definitions, we can now prove the result of the lemma. We proceed as
follows. Given∆x, 0 < ∆x <
L
2 , let the function∆Q(∆x) be given by
∆Q(∆x) = min
y∈[mid(IC)−LC,mid(IC)]
F (y,∆x).
Note that the function∆Q(∆x) is well defined as the function F (y,∆x) is continuous in y on IC .
We then have that from Eq. (2) that
∆Q(∆x) > 0, 0 < ∆x <
L
2
.
For y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)] and x ∈ R such that
||x∗(y)− x|| = ∆x, y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)],
we obtain from the above results that∣∣q(x∗(y)|y)PC(x∗(y))− q(x|y)PC(x)∣∣ ≥ ∆Q(∆x).
To see this, not that in this case we have by definition that
F (y,∆x) ≥ min
z∈[mid(IC)−LC ,mid(IC)]
F (z,∆x) = ∆Q(∆x)
and∣∣∣q(x∗(y)|y)PC(x∗(y))− q(x|y)PC(x)∣∣∣ ≥ min{Fl(y,∆x), Fh(y,∆x)} = F (y,∆x).
It then follows that ∣∣∣q(x∗(y)|y)PC(x∗(y))− q(x|y)PC(x)∣∣∣ ≥ ∆Q(∆x).
To complete the proof, it remains to show that the function ∆Q(∆x) is non-decreasing in ∆x on
(0, L/2), or equivalently that the function Fl(y,∆x) and Fh(y,∆x) are non-decreasing in ∆x on
(0, L/2). This is indeed the case, as from the analysis in [2] we have that for
y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)]
the function q(x|y)PC(x) is non-decreasing in x on [x∗(y)− L/2, x∗(y)], and non-increasing in x
on [x∗(y), x∗(y) + L/2].
This completes the proof of the lemma.
We use Lemma 5 in the next subsection to characterize the function x∗δ(y).
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E.2 Properties of x∗δ(y)
In this subsection we characterize the function x∗δ(y). Our first result for the function x
∗
δ(y) states
that if a discrete interval community C = (Cd, Cs) on a given interval IC has a small enough
distance δ, then the difference
||x∗(y)− x∗δ(y)||, y ∈ IC ,
is small. More precisely, we have the following result.
Lemma 6. Consider a constant Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and an interval
IC = [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R.
For every ∆x∗ , 0 < ∆x∗ , there exists a δ0(LC) > 0 such that for all discrete interval communities
Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC) the following is true. If
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cδ
and
LC <
L
2
,
then we have that
||x∗(y)− x∗δ(y)|| < ∆x∗ , y ∈ IC ,
where
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x)
with
PCδ (x) = Ep
∑
y∈Cd
p(x|y),
and
x∗(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PC(x),
with
PC(x) = Ep
∫
IC
p(x|y)dy, x ∈ R.
Note that in the statement of the Lemma, the parameter δ0(LC) depends on the half-length LC of
the interval IC .
Proof. Let∆x∗ be as given in the statement of the lemma. Then by Lemma 5 there exists a∆Q > 0
such that if
||x∗(y)− x|| ≥ ∆x∗ , y ∈ IC ,
then we have that ∣∣∣q(x∗(y)|y)PC(x∗(y))− q(x|y)PC(x)∣∣∣ ≥ ∆Q.
Using this∆Q, let ∆P be given by
∆P =
1
2
∆Q.
By Lemma 2, there exists a δ0(LC) > 0 such that for all discrete interval communities on IC with
distance δ, 0 < δ < δ0(LC), we have that∣∣∣Pc(x)− δdPδ,C(x)∣∣∣ < ∆P , x ∈ R.
Using these definitions of∆Q,∆P , and δ0(LC), we prove the result of the lemma by contradiction.
That is we assume that there exists a discrete interval communities C = (Cd, Cs) on IC with
distance δ < δ0(LC) and a y ∈ IC such that
||x∗(y)− x∗δ(y)|| ≥ ∆x∗ ,
and show that this leads to a contradiction.
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Suppose that there exists a discrete interval communities C = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ <
δ0(LC) and a y ∈ IC such that
||x∗(y)− x∗δ(y)|| ≥ ∆x∗ .
Note that for this community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) and for this y, we have that
q(x∗δ(y)|y)PCδ (x
∗
δ(y))− q(x
∗(y)|y)PCδ (x
∗(y)) ≥ 0,
as by definition we have that
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x).
This implies that
δd
[
q(x∗δ(y)|y)PCδ (x
∗
δ(y))− q(x
∗(y)|y)PCδ (x
∗(y))
]
= δdq(x
∗
δ(y)|y)PCδ (x
∗
δ(y))− q(x
∗
δ(y)|y)PC(x
∗
δ(y)) + · · ·
+q(x∗δ(y)|y)PC(x
∗
δ(y))− q(x
∗(y)|y)PC(x
∗(y)) + · · ·
+q(x∗(y)|y)PC(x
∗(y))− δdq(x
∗(y)|y)PCδ (x
∗(y))
≥ 0,
or
q(x∗δ(y)|y)
[
δdPCδ (x
∗
δ(y))− PC(x
∗
δ(y))
]
+ q(x∗(y)|y)
[
PC(x
∗(y))− δdPCδ (x
∗(y))
]
≥ q(x∗(y)|y)PC(x
∗(y))− q(x∗δ(y)|y)PC(x
∗
δ(y)).
Note that
q(x∗(y)|y)PC(x
∗(y))− q(x∗δ(y)|y)PC(x
∗
δ(y)) ≥ 0
as we have that
x∗(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PC(x),
and we obtain that
q(x∗δ(y)|y)
[
δdPCδ (x
∗
δ(y))− PC(x
∗
δ(y))
]
+ q(x∗(y)|y)
[
PC(x
∗(y))− δdPCδ (x
∗(y))
]
≥ q(x∗(y)|y)PC(x
∗(y))− q(x∗δ(y)|y)PC(x
∗
δ(y)) ≥ 0. (3)
By construction we have for δ, 0 < δ < δ0(LC), that
q(x∗δ(y)|y)
(
δdPCδ (x
∗
δ(y))− PC(x
∗
δ(y))
)
+ q(x∗(y)|y)
(
PC(x
∗(y))− δdPCδ (x
∗(y))
)
(4)
≤ q(x∗δ(y)|y)
∣∣∣δdPCδ (x∗δ(y))− PC(x∗δ(y))∣∣∣+ q(x∗(y)|y)∣∣∣PC(x∗(y))− δdPCδ (x∗(y))∣∣∣
< 2∆P .
Recall that we chose∆Q and∆P such that
2∆P = ∆Q,
and Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) imply that for all δ such that
0 < δ < δ0(LC)
we have that
q(x∗(y)|y)PC(x
∗(y))− q(x∗δ(y)|y)PC(x
∗
δ(y)) < 2∆P = ∆Q. (5)
However, the result of Eq. (5) leads to a contradiction. To see this, note that we chose∆Q such that
for the case where
||x∗(y)− x∗δ(y)|| ≥ ∆
∗
x
we have that
q(x∗(y)|y)PC(x
∗(y))− q(x∗δ(y)|y)PC(x
∗
δ(y)) ≥ ∆Q, (6)
where we use that fact that
q(x∗(y)|y)PC(x
∗(y)) ≥ q(x∗δ(y)|y)PC(x
∗
δ(y))
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as we have that
x∗(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PC(x).
The condition in Eq. (6) which we obtain by construction contradicts the result of Eq. (5), which we
obtained under the assumption that there exists a discrete interval communitiesC = (Cd, Cs) on IC
with distance δ < δ0(LC) and a y ∈ IC such that
||x∗(y)− x∗δ(y)|| ≥ ∆x∗ .
This implies that there can not exist a discrete interval communities C = (Cd, Cs) on IC with
distance δ < δ0(LC) and a y ∈ IC such that
||x∗(y)− x∗δ(y)| ≥ ∆x∗ .
The result of the lemma then follows.
The next result provides additional properties for the function x∗δ(y). In particular, it provides con-
ditions under which the optimization problem
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x), y ∈ IC ,
has a unique solution.
Lemma 7. Consider a constant Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and an interval
IC = [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R.
For every∆x∗ ,
0 < ∆x∗ < LC ,
there exists a δ0(LC) > 0 such that for all discrete interval communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with
distance δ < δ0(LC) the following is true. If we have that
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and
LC <
L
2
,
then the solution x∗δ(y) to the optimization problem
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x), y ∈ IC ,
where
PCδ (x) = Ep
∑
y∈Cd
p(x|y),
has the properties that
(a) there exists a unique optimal solution x∗δ(y), y ∈ IC , given by the unique solution to the
equation
q′(x|y)PCδ (x) + q(x|y)PCδ
′(x) = 0, x ∈ IC ,
where PCδ
′(x) is the derivative of PCδ(x) with respect to x.
(b) for y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆x∗ ], we have that
x∗δ(y) ∈ (y,mid(IC)) ∩ supp(q(·|y)).
(c) for y ∈ [mid(IC) + ∆x∗ ,mid(IC) + LC ], we have that
x∗δ(y) ∈ (mid(IC), y) ∩ supp(q(·|y)).
(d) the function x∗δ(y) is strictly increasing and differentiable on the interval
[mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆x∗ ] ∪ [mid(IC) + ∆x∗ ,mid(IC) + LC ].
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Proof. Let
y0 = mid(IC),
and let ∆x∗ as given in the statement of the lemma. From the analysis in [2] we have for x
∗(y),
y ∈ IC , given by
x∗(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PC(x), y ∈ IC ,
where
PC(x) = Ep
∫
IC
p(x|y)dy, x ∈ R.
that
x∗(y0 −∆x∗) ∈ (y0 −∆x∗ , y0),
and
x∗(y0 +∆x∗) ∈ (y0, y0 +∆x∗).
For∆x∗ as given in the statement of the lemma, let ∆b be given by
2∆b = y0 − x
∗(y0 −∆x∗),
i.e. we have that
x∗(y0 −∆x∗) = y0 − 2∆b.
From the analysis in [2], we have that
x∗(y0 −∆x∗) ∈ (y0 −∆x∗ , y0),
and we obtain that
∆b > 0.
Consider the function∆∗(y) given by
∆∗(y) = ||y − x∗(y)||, y ∈ IC .
Furthermore, from the analysis in [2] we have that the function∆∗(y) given by
∆∗(y) = ||y − x∗(y)||, y ∈ IC ,
is symmetric on IC with respect to y0 we have that
x∗(y0 +∆x∗) = y0 + 2∆b.
Using ∆b as defined above, let δ
(1)
0 , δ
(1)
0 > 0, be such that for all discrete interval communities on
IC with distance δ < δ
(1)
0 we have that
1. PCδ (x) is strictly concave in x on IC ,
2. PCδ (x) is strictly increasing in x on [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆b], and
3. PCδ (x) is strictly decreasing in x on [mid(IC) + ∆b,mid(IC) + LC ].
Note that such a constant δ
(1)
0 exists by Lemma 4.
Furthermore, let δ
(2)
0 , δ
(2)
0 > 0, be such that for all discrete interval communities on IC with distance
δ < δ
(2)
0 we have that
||x∗(y)− x∗δ(y)|| < ∆b, y ∈ IC .
Note that such a constant δ
(2)
0 exists by Lemma 6.
Let
δ0(LC) = min
{
δ
(1)
0 , δ
(2)
0
}
.
We first prove Property (a) of the lemma. To do that, note that by construction the functionPCδ (x) is
strictly concave on IC , strictly increasing on the interval [mid(IC)−LC ,mid(IC)−∆b], and strictly
decreasing on the interval [mid(IC) + ∆b,mid(IC) + ∆b]. To prove Property (a) of the lemma,
we can then use the same argument as given in [2] to prove the result that under the assumption as
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given in the statement of the lemma we have that there exists a unique solution x∗δ(y), y ∈ IC , to
the optimization problem
x∗(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PC(x), y ∈ IC ,
and x∗(y) is given by the unique solution to the equation
q′(x|y)PC(x) + q(x|y)P
′
C(x) = 0, x ∈ IC ,
Next we proof Property (b) and (d) for the case where
y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆x∗ ].
Property (c) and (d) for the case where y ∈ [mid(IC) + ∆x∗ ,mid(IC) + LC ] can be proven using
the same argument.
From the analysis in [2] we have that the function x∗(y) is strictly increasing on IC , and we obtain
that
x∗(y) ≤ x∗(y0 −∆x∗) = mid(IC)− 2∆b, y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆x∗ ].
Furthermore, by construction we have
||x∗(y)− x∗δ(y)|| < ∆b, y ∈ IC ,
and it follows that
x∗δ(y) < mid(IC)−∆b, y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆x∗ ].
Using this result with the fact that by construction the function PCδ (x) is strictly increasing and
strictly concave in x on the interval [mid(IC) − LC ,mid(IC) − ∆b], we can then use the same
argument to prove Property (b) as given in [2] to prove the result that under the assumption as given
in the statement of the lemma we have that
x∗(y) ∈ (y,mid(IC)) ∩ supp(q(·|y)).
Furthermore, using the same argument as given in [2] to show that the function x∗(y) is strictly
increasing and differentiable on the interval IC , we can show that x
∗
δ(y) is strictly increasing and
differentiable on the interval [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆x∗ ].
The result of the lemma then follows.
-
Lemma 8. Consider a constant Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and an interval
IC = [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R.
There exists a δ0(LC) > 0 such that for all discrete interval communitiesCδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with
distance δ < δ0(LC) the following is true. If we have that
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and
LC <
L
2
,
then for
y ∈ [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)− LC)
we have that
x∗δ(y) ≤ x
∗
δ
(
mid(IC)− LC
)
,
and for
y ∈ (mid(IC) + LC ,mid(IC) + L)
we have that
x∗δ(y) ≥ x
∗
δ
(
mid(IC) + LC
)
.
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Proof. We first consider the case where
y ∈ [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)− LC).
Let
yl = mid(IC)− LC .
From the analysis in [2] we have that
x∗(yl) ∈ [yl,mid(IC)) = [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)), (7)
and hence
x∗(yl) < mid(IC).
Using this result, let ∆x be given by
∆x =
mid(IC)− x∗(yl)
2
.
Note that by Eq.(7) we have that
0 < ∆x <
LC
2
.
Let δ
(1)
0 > 0 be such that for all discrete interval communities C = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance
δ < δ
(1)
0 we have that the function PCδ (x) is strictly increasing and strictly concave on [mid(IC)−
LC ,mid(IC)−∆x], and that
||x∗δ(y)− x
∗(y)|| ≤ ∆x, y ∈ [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)].
Note that such a δ0(LC) exists by Lemma 4 and 6.
By construction we have that
x∗(yl) ≤ mid(IC)− 2∆x.
Furthermore from the analysis in [2] we have that
x∗(y) ≤ x∗(yl), y ∈ [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)− LC).
Combining this result we the fact that
||x∗δ(y)− x
∗(y)|| ≤ ∆x, y ∈ [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)],
we obtain that
x∗δ(yl) < mid(IC)−∆x
and
x∗δ(y) < mid(IC)−∆x, y ∈ [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)− LC).
As by construction we have that PCδ (x) is strictly increasing and strictly concave on [mid(IC) −
LC ,mid(IC) − ∆x], we can show that under the assumptions given in the lemma we have for all
discrete interval communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ < δ
(1)
0 that
x∗δ(y) ≤ x
∗
δ
(
mid(IC)− LC
)
, y ∈ [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)),
using the same argument as given in the analysis in [2] to prove that interval communities C =
(IC , IC) we have that
x∗(y) ≤ x∗
(
mid(IC)− LC
)
, y ∈ [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)).
Using the same approach, we can show that there exists δ
(2)
0 , δ
(2)
0 > 0, such that for all discrete
interval communities on IC with distance δ < δ
(2)
0 we have for
y ∈ (mid(IC) + LC ,mid(IC) + L)
that
x∗δ(y) ≥ x
∗
δ
(
mid(IC) + LC
)
.
The result of the lemma then follows by setting
δ0(LC) = min{δ
(1)
0 , δ
(2)
0 }.
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E.3 Properties of∆∗δ(y)
Having analyzed the function x∗δ(y) given by
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x), y ∈ IC .
we study next the properties of the function∆∗δ(y), y ∈ IC , given by
∆∗δ(y) = ||y − x
∗
δ(y)||.
We have the following result.
Lemma 9. Consider a constant Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and an interval
IC = [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R.
For every ∆x∗ , 0 < ∆x∗ < LC , there exists a δ0(LC) > 0 such that for all discrete interval
communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC) the following is true. If
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and
LC <
L
2
,
then we have that the function∆∗δ(y) given by
∆∗δ(y) = ||y − x
∗
δ(y)||, y ∈ IC ,
where
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x),
is strictly decreasing and differentiable on [mid(IC)−LC,mid(IC)−∆x∗ ], and strictly increasing
and differentiable on [mid(IC) + ∆x∗ ,mid(IC)] + LC ].
Proof. Let
y0 = mid(IC).
We first show that there exists δ(1), δ(1) > 0, such that for all discrete interval communities on IC
with distance δ < δ
(1)
0 the function∆
∗
δ(y) is strictly decreasing and differentiable on [y0−LC , y0−
∆x∗ ]. To do this, let ∆x∗ be as in the statement of the lemma, and let then∆b be given by
2∆b = |y0 − x
∗(y0 −∆x∗)|.
From the analysis in [2] we have that
x∗(y0 −∆x∗) ∈ (y0 −∆x∗ , y0),
and it follows that
∆b > 0.
We then choose δ
(1)
0 as follows. Let δ
(1)
0 , δ
(1)
0 > 0, be such that for all discrete interval communities
on IC with distance δ < δ
(1)
0 we have that PCδ (x) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in x on
[y0 − LC , y0 −∆x∗ ], and
||x∗(y)− x∗δ(y)|| < ∆b, y ∈ [y0 − LC , y0 −∆x∗ ].
Note that such a constant δ
(1)
0 exists by Lemma 4 and 6.
Using this construction, we have for all discrete interval communities on IC with distance δ < δ
(1)
0
that
x∗δ(y) ∈ [y,mid(IC)−∆b], y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆x∗ ].
To see this note the following. Recall that∆b is given by
2∆b = ||y0 − x
∗(y0 −∆x∗)||.
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From the analysis in [2] we have that the function x∗(y) is strictly increasing on IC , and we have
that
x∗(y) ∈ [y,mid(IC)− 2∆b] ∩ supp(q(·|y)), y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆x∗ ].
Furthermore, by construction we have that
||x∗(y)− x∗δ(y)|| < ∆b, y ∈ IC .
Combining these results, it then follows that
x∗δ(y) ∈ [y,mid(IC)−∆b], y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆x∗ ].
Combining this result with the fact that by construction the function PCδ (x) is strictly increasing
and strictly concave in x on the interval [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆b], and in order to show that
∆∗δ(y) is strictly decreasing and differentiable on [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆x∗ ] we can use the
same argument as given in [2] to show the function ∆∗(y) is strictly decreasing and differentiable
on [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)] where
∆∗(y) = ||y − x∗(y)||, y ∈ IC .
Using the same approach, we can show that there exists δ
(2)
0 , δ
(2)
0 > 0, such that for all discrete
interval communities on IC with distance δ < δ
(2)
0 the function∆
∗
δ(y) strictly increasing and differ-
entiable on [mid(IC) + ∆x∗ ,mid(IC) + LC ].
The result of the lemma then follows by setting
δ0(LC) = min{δ
(1)
0 , δ
(2)
0 }.
E.4 Properties of q(x∗δ(y)|y)
Finally, we characterize the function q(x∗δ(y)|y) where
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x).
The first results states that if δ is small enough, then we have for a discrete interval communities
C = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ that that the distance∣∣∣q(x∗δ(y)|y)− q(x∗(y)|y)∣∣∣
is small, where
x∗(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PC(x).
Lemma 10. Consider a constant Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and an interval
IC = [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R.
. For every ∆q, ∆q > 0, there exists a δ0(LC) > 0 such that for all discrete interval communities
Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC) the following is true. If
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and
LC <
L
2
,
then we have that ∣∣∣q(x∗δ(y)|y)− q(x∗(y)|y)∣∣∣ < ∆q, y ∈ IC ,
where
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x)
and
x∗(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PC(x).
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Proof. Let∆x, ∆x > 0, be such that
∆x <
∆q
maxx∈supp(g) |g′(x)|
,
where g is the function of Assumption 1. Note that such a ∆x exists by Assumption 1.
Let δ0(LC) be such that for all discrete interval communities on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC) we
have that
||x∗δ(y)− x
∗(y)|| < ∆x, y ∈ IC .
Note that such a δ0(LC) exists by Lemma 6.
We then have that∣∣∣q(x∗δ(y)|y)− q(x∗(y)|y)∣∣∣ < max
x∈supp(g)
|g′(x)| · ||x∗δ(y)− x
∗(y)||.
As by construction we have that
∆x <
∆q
maxx∈supp(g) |g′(x)|
and
||x∗δ(y)− x
∗(y)|| < ∆x, y ∈ IC ,
we obtain that ∣∣∣q(x∗δ(y)|y)− q(x∗(y)|y)∣∣∣ < ∆q, y ∈ IC .
The result of the lemma then follows.
The next results provides properties of the function q(x∗δ(y)|y) that we will use in our analysis.
Lemma 11. Consider a constant Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, an interval
IC = [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R.
For every ∆q , 0 < ∆q > LC , there exists a δ0(LC) > 0 such that for all discrete interval commu-
nities Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC) the following is true. If
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and
LC <
L
2
,
then we have for
y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆q] ∪ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆q]
that
q(x∗δ(y)|y) > 0
and that q(x∗δ(y)|y) is differentiable with with respect to y.
Proof. Let δ0(LC) > 0 be such that for all discrete interval communities C = (Cd, Cs) on IC with
distance δ < δ0(LC) we have that the function
∆∗δ(y) = ||y − x
∗
δ(y)||
is differentiable in y on
[mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆q] ∪ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆q].
Note that such a δ0(LC) exists by Lemma 9.
Recall that
q(x∗δ(y)|y) = g(∆
∗
δ(y)),
where g is the function in Assumption 1.
37
As we have that
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x)
it follows that
q(x∗δ(y)|y)PCδ (x
∗
δ(y)) ≥ q(y|y)PCδ (y) = g(0)PCδ(y) > 0,
as by Assumption 1 we have that
g(0) > 0
and by Lemma 4 we have that
PCδ (y) > 0, y ∈ R.
This implies that
q(x∗δ(y)|y)PCδ (x
∗
δ(y)) > 0, y ∈ R,
and hence
q(x∗δ(y)|y) > 0, y ∈ R.
From this result we obtain that
x∗δ(y) ∈ supp(q(·|y), y ∈ R.
By Assumption 1 we have that the function g is differentiable on supp(g), and by construction we
have that the function∆∗δ(y) is differentiable in y on
[mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆q] ∪ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆q].
Combining these results, we obtain that the function
q(x∗δ(y)|y) = g(∆
∗
δ(y))
is differentiable in y on
[mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆q] ∪ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆q].
The result of the lemma then follows.
F Proof of Proposition 2 and 3
In this appendix we prove Proposition 2 and 3 using the analysis of Appendix E. Recall that Propo-
sition 2 characterizes the optimal content x∗δ(y) that a agent y ∈ Cs produces in a discrete interval
community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) that is part of a ǫ−equilibrium as given by Proposition 1, and Proposi-
tion 3 characterizes the function
∆∗δ(y) = ||x
∗
δ(y)− y||,
i.e. by how much the agent adapts its optimal content towards the main interest of the community
Cδ = (Cd, Cs).
We obtain the results of Proposition 2 and 3 using the analysis of Appendix E as follows. Let(
C, {α∗C(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
be a ǫ−equilibrium as given by Proposition 1. Then we have
that for every discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C that
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and
LC <
L
2
,
where LC is the length of the interval IC such that
Cd = A
(d) ∩ IC .
As a result, the properties of a discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C satisfy the assump-
tions in Lemma 7 and 9. Proposition then follows immediately from Lemma 7 and 9.
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G Properties of β∗
Cδ
(·, y)
In this appendix, we characterize how agents in a discrete interval community optimally allocated
their content production rate. More precisely, given an interval IC ⊂ R and a discrete interval
community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ, we characterize how an agents y ∈ Cs allocate
their content production rate βCδ(·|y) in communityC. For this, we assume that there is a constraint
on the maximal production rate, i.e. we have that
||βCδ (·|y)|| =
∫
R
βC(x|y)dx ≤ βC(y), y ∈ Cs,
where βCδ(y) > 0 denotes the maximal production rate that agent y ∈ Cd can allocate to community
Cδ . In this case the optimal content production rate β
∗
Cδ
(·|y) of agent y ∈ Cδ is given by
β∗Cδ (·|y) = argmax
βCδ (·|y):||βCδ (·|y)||≤βCδ (y)
∫
R
βCδ (x|y)[q(x|y)PCδ (x) − αCδc]dx,
where
αCδ =
∑
y∈Cd
αCδ (y),
and
PCδ(x) =
∑
y∈Cd
αCδ(y)p(x|y).
Our first result provides a characterization of the optimal content production rate allocation for
discrete interval communities.
Lemma 12. Consider an interval IC = [mid(IC) − LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R, and a discrete
interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ. For y ∈ Cs and βC(y) > 0, let the
function β∗Cδ(·|y) be given by
β∗Cδ (·|y) = argmax
βCδ (·|y):||βCδ (·|y)||≤βCδ (y)
∫
x∈R
βCδ(x|y)
[
q(x|y)PCδ (x)− αCδc
]
dx
where
αCδ =
∑
y∈Cd
αC(y),
and
PCδ(x) =
∑
y∈Cd
p(x|y).
Furthermore, let
b∗ = max
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x),
and let the set A ⊆ R be given by
A =
{
x ∈ R|q(x|y)PCδ (x) = b
∗
}
.
If we have that
max
x∈R
(
q(x|y)PCδ (x) − αCδc
)
> 0, y ∈ IC ,
then the optimal production rate allocation has the property that∫
∈A
β∗Cδ (x|y)dx =
∫
R
β∗Cδ(x|y)dx.
Proof. This lemma can be proved using the same argument as given in [2] where the same result is
proven for interval communitiesC = (IC , IC) under the continuous agent model.
The next result follows directly from Lemma 12.
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Corollary 1. Consider constants Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and Eq , 0 < Eq , and an interval IC =
[mid(IC)−LC ,mid(IC) +LC) ⊂ R. For every∆y , 0 < ∆y , there exists a δ0(LC) > 0 such that
for all discrete interval communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC) the following
is true. Suppose that
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and
LC <
L
2
.
If for agent y ∈ Cd we have that
max
x∈R
(
q(x|y)PCδ (x) − αCδc
)
> 0,
where
αCδ =
∑
y∈Cd
Ep,
and
PCδ(x) =
∑
y∈Cd
Epp(x|y),
then
β∗Cδ (x|y) = Eqδ
(
x− x∗δ(y)
)
, x ∈ R,
where
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x),
is an optimal solution for
β∗Cδ(·|y) = argmax
βCδ (·|y):||βCδ (·|y)||≤Eq
∫
x∈R
βCδ(x|y)
[
q(x|y)PCδ (x) − αCδc
]
dx.
H Properties of Q∗
Cδ
(x)
In the previous appendix we studied the properties of the optimal content production rate allocation
β∗Cδ(·|y) of an agent y ∈ Cd in a discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs). In this appendix, we
characterize the resulting optimal content supply functionQ∗Cδ(x), x ∈ R, given by
Q∗Cδ(x) =
∑
y∈Cs
Eqδ
(
x− x∗δ(y)
)
q(x|y)dx, x ∈ R, (8)
where
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x).
Lemma 13. Consider constants Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and Eq , 0 < Eq , and an interval IC =
[mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R. For every∆Q > 0 and∆x > 0, such that
∆Q +∆x < LC ,
there exists a δ0(LC) > 0 such that for all discrete interval communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with
distance δ < δ0(LC) the following is true. Suppose that
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and
max
x∈R
(
q(x|y)PCδ (x)− αCδc
)
> 0, y ∈ Cs,
as well as
LC <
L
2
.
Furthermore, let
IC
(1) = [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆Q] ∩ Cs,
IC
(2) = (mid(IC)−∆Q,mid(IC) + ∆Q) ∩ Cs,
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and
IC
(3) = [mid(IC) + ∆Q,mid(IC) + LC ] ∩ Cs.
Then the optimal content supply functionQ∗C(x), x ∈ R, as given by Eq. (8) is such that
Q∗Cδ(x) = Eq
∑
y∈IC(1)
δ
(
x− x∗δ(y))q(x
∗
δ (y)|y
)
+ · · ·
+Eq
∑
y∈IC(2)
δ
(
x− x∗δ(y))q(x
∗
δ(y)|y
)
+ · · ·
+Eq
∑
y∈IC(3)
δ
(
x− x∗δ(y)
)
q(x∗δ(y)|y),
where δ(·) is the Dirac delta function, and
a) x∗δ(y) is the unique solution to the optimization problem
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x).
b) for y ∈ IC
(1) we have that
x∗δ(y) ∈ (y,mid(IC)),
c) for y ∈ IC
(3) we have that
x∗δ(y) ∈ (mid(IC), y),
d) and for y ∈ IC
(2) we have that
x∗δ(y) ∈ (mid(IC)−∆Q −∆x,mid(IC) + ∆Q +∆x).
Proof. Let δ0(LC), δ0(LC) > 0, be such that for all discrete interval communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs)
on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC) the following is true,
1) the optimization problem
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x)
has a unique solution for y ∈ IC .
2) for y ∈ IC
(1) we have that
x∗δ(y) ∈ (y,mid(IC)).
3) for y ∈ IC
(3) we have that
x∗δ(y) ∈ (mid(IC), y).
4) we have that
||x∗(y)− x∗δ(y)|| < ∆x, y ∈ IC ,
where
x∗(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PC(x)
and
PC(x) = Ep
∫
IC
p(x|y)dy.
Note that such a δ0(LC) exists by Lemma 7 and 6.
Using Property 1)-3) of the above construction, we obtain Property a)-c) of the lemma.
Furthermore, combining Property 4 of the above construction with the analysis in [2] which shows
that
x∗(y) ∈ (y,mid(IC)), y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)]
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and
x∗(y) ∈ (mid(IC), y), y ∈ [mid(IC),mid(IC) + LC ],
it follows that
x∗δ(y) ∈ (mid(IC)−∆Q −∆x,mid(IC) + ∆Q +∆x), y ∈ IC
(2).
The result of the lemma then follows.
The next result states that the support of the optimal content supply function Q∗Cδ(x), x ∈ R, is
contained in IC for all discrete interval communities on IC with a small enough distance δ. More
precisely, we have the following result.
Lemma 14. Consider constants Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and Eq , 0 < Eq , and an interval IC =
[mid(IC) − LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R. Then there exists a δ0(LC) > 0 such that for all dis-
crete interval communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC) the following is true.
Suppose that
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and ∫
R
β∗Cδ(x|y)dx = Eq, y ∈ Cs,
as well as
LC <
L
2
.
Then we have for the content supply functionQ∗Cδ(x), x ∈ R, as given by Equation (8) that
supp(Q∗Cδ(·)) ⊆ [mid(IC)− L
∗
Cδ
,mid(IC) + L
∗
Cδ
] ⊂ IC ,
where
0 < L∗Cδ < LC .
Proof. From the analysis in [2] we have for the function x∗(y), y ∈ IC , given by
x∗(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PC(x)
where
PC(x) = Ep
∫
IC
p(x|y)dy,
that the image I∗C of x
∗(y), y ∈ IC , is such that
I∗C ⊆ [mid(IC)− L
∗
C ,mid(IC) + L
∗
C ]
where
0 < L∗C < LC .
Using this result, let
∆x =
LC − L∗C
2
> 0
and
∆Q =
L∗C
2
> 0.
Using this definition of∆x, let
L∗Cδ = L
∗
C +∆x.
Note that
0 < L∗Cδ < LC .
Using the above definition of ∆x, let δ
(1)
0 > 0 be such that for all discrete interval communities
C = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ < δ
(1)
0 we have that
||x∗δ(y)− x
∗(y)|| < ∆x.
Note that such a δ
(1)
0 exists by Lemma 6.
42
Using the above definitions of ∆x and ∆Q, let for a given discrete interval community Cδ =
(Cd, Cs) on the interval IC with distance δ the sets IC
(1), IC
(2), and IC
(3) be given by
IC
(1) = [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆Q] ∩ Cs,
IC
(2) = (mid(IC)−∆Q,mid(IC) + ∆Q) ∩ Cs,
and
IC
(3) = [mid(IC) + ∆Q,mid(IC) + LC ] ∩ Cs.
Furthermore, using the definitions of IC
(1), IC
(2), and IC
(3), let δ
(2)
0 > 0 be such that for all discrete
interval communities on IC with distance δ < δ
(2)
0 we have that
a) for y ∈ IC
(1) we have that
x∗δ(y) ∈ (y,mid(IC)),
b) for y ∈ IC
(3) we have that
x∗δ(y) ∈ (mid(IC), y),
c) and for y ∈ IC
(2) we have that
x∗δ(y) ∈ (mid(IC)−∆Q −∆x,mid(IC) + ∆Q +∆x).
Note that such a δ
(2)
0 exists by Lemmas 7.
Let
δ0(LC) = min{δ
(1)
0 , δ
(2)
0 }.
It then follows that for all that for all discrete interval communities on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC),
we have that
x∗δ(y) = [mid(IC)− L
∗
Cδ
,mid(IC) + L
∗
Cδ
], y ∈ Cs,
and
supp(Q∗Cδ(·)) ⊆ [mid(IC)− L
∗
Cδ
,mid(IC) + L
∗
Cδ
].
As by construction we have that
L∗Cδ < LC ,
the result of the lemma then follows.
I Proof of Proposition 5
In this appendix we prove Proposition 5 using the results of Appendix H. Recall that Proposition 5
characterizes the content supply functionQCδ(x) for a discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs)
that is part of a ǫ−equilibrium as given by Proposition 1.
We obtain the result of Proposition 5 using the results of Appendix H as follows. Let(
C, {α∗C(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
be a ǫ−equilibrium as given by Proposition 1. Then we have
that for every discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C that
LC <
L
2
where LC is the length of the interval IC such that
Cd = A
(d) ∩ IC ,
as well as
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and
β∗Cδ(·|y) = Eqδ(x
∗
Cδ
(y)− x), y ∈ Cs
where
x∗Cδ (y) = argmaxx∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x),
and δ is the Dirac delta function.
As a result, the properties of a discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C satisfy the assump-
tion in Lemma 13 and 14. Proposition 5 then follows immediately from Lemma 13 14.
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J Proof of Proposition 6
In this appendix we prove Proposition 6. To do that, we first study for a given discrete interval
communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs) the properties of the function F
(d)
Cδ
(y) given by
F
(d)
Cδ
(y) = EpEq
∑
z∈Cs
∫
x∈R
[
p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x
∗
δ(z)|z)− c
]
dx, y ∈ R.
where Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and Eq , Eq > 0, are the bounds on the agents’ content consumption and
production rates.
Our first lemma shows that δsF
(d)
Cδ
(y) closely approximates the function F
(d)
C (y) that we used for
our analysis of interval communities C = (IC , IC) in [2]. More precisely, we have the following
result.
Lemma 15. Consider constants Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and Eq , 0 < Eq , and an interval IC =
[mid(IC) − LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R. For every ∆U > 0 there exists a δ0(LC) > 0 such that for
all discrete interval communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC) the following is
true. Suppose that we have that
2LC < min{b, L}
where b is the constant of Assumption 1, as we well as
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd.
Then the function F
(d)
Cδ
(y) given by
F
(d)
Cδ
(y) = EpEq
∑
z∈Cs
[
p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x
∗
δ(z)|z)− c
]
dx, y ∈ R,
where
x∗δ(z) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|z)PCδ (x), z ∈ Cs,
and
PCδ (x) = Ep
∑
y∈Cd
p(x|y),
has the property that ∣∣∣δsF (d)Cδ (y)− F (d)C (y)
∣∣∣ < ∆U , y ∈ R,
for
F
(d)
C (y) = EpEq
∫
z∈IC
[
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
dz
where
x∗(z) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|z)PC(x), z ∈ IC ,
and
PC(x) = Ep
∫
IC
p(x|y)dy.
Proof. Note that∣∣∣δsF (d)Cδ (y)− F (d)C (y)
∣∣∣ (9)
= EpEq
∣∣∣∣∣δs
∑
z∈Cs
[
p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x
∗
δ(z)|z)− c
]
−
∫
z∈IC
[
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
dz
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ δs
∑
z∈Cs
∣∣∣p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x∗δ(z)|z)− p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)∣∣∣+ · · ·
+
∣∣∣∣∣δs
∑
z∈Cs
[
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
−
∫
z∈IC
[
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
dz
∣∣∣∣∣ .
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In the following we show that there exists a δ0(LC) > 0 such that for all discrete interval communi-
ties on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC) we have that
δs
∑
z∈Cs
∣∣∣p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x∗δ(z)|z)− p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)∣∣∣ < ∆U2EpEq (10)
and∣∣∣∣∣δs
∑
z∈Cs
[
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
−
∫
IC
[
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
dz
∣∣∣∣∣ < ∆U2EpEq . (11)
Using Eq. 9, these two results establish that
EpEq
∣∣∣∣∣δs
∑
z∈Cs
[
p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x
∗
δ(z)|z)− c
]
−
∫
IC
[
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
dz
∣∣∣∣∣ < ∆U ,
which is the bound that we wish to obtain.
In order to derive these two results, we first consider the term given by Eq. (10) for which we have
that
δs
∑
z∈Cs
∣∣∣p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x∗δ(z)|z)− p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)∣∣∣
≤ δs
∑
z∈Cs
p(x∗δ(z)|y)
∣∣∣q(x∗δ(z)|z)− q(x∗(z)|z)∣∣∣+ δs ∑
z∈Cs
q(x∗(z)|z)
∣∣∣p(x∗δ(z)|y)− p(x∗(z)|y)∣∣∣
≤ δs
∑
z∈Cs
∣∣∣q(x∗δ(z)|z)− q(x∗(z)|z)∣∣∣+ δ ∑
z∈Cs
∣∣∣p(x∗δ(z)|y)− p(x∗(z)|y)∣∣∣
≤ δs max
x∈supp(g(·))
|g′(x)|
∑
z∈Cs
||x∗δ(z)− x
∗(z)||+ max
x∈[0,L]
|f ′(x)|
∑
z∈Cs
||x∗δ(z)− x
∗(z)||,
where we used the fact that by Assumption 1 the derivatives of the function f and g that define
p(x|y) and q(x|y) are bounded. In particular, by Assumption 1 the functions f and g have bounded
derivatives, i.e. we have that
|f ′(x)| < Mf , x ∈ [0, L],
and
|g′(x)| < Mg, x ∈ supp(g(·)).
It then follows that
δs
∑
z∈Cs
∣∣∣p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x∗δ(z)|z)− p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)∣∣∣ < δs(Mf +Mg) ∑
z∈Cs
||x∗δ(z)− x
∗(z)||. (12)
Next we consider the term given by Eq. (11),∣∣∣∣∣δs
∑
z∈Cs
[
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
−
∫
z∈IC
[
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
dz
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Note that the expression
δs
∑
z∈Cs
[
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
can be interpreted as the Riemann sum approximation of the integral∫
z∈IC
[
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
dz,
and we can use the same argument as given in Lemma 2 to establish an upper bound on the term
given by Eq. (11).
More precisely, by Assumption 1 the functions f and g have bounded derivatives, i.e. we have that
|f ′(x)| < Mf , x ∈ [0, L],
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and
|g′(x)| < Mg, x ∈ supp(g(·)).
Furthermore, from the analysis in [2] we have that there exists a constantMz > 0 such that∣∣∣∣ ddz x∗(z)
∣∣∣∣ < Mz, y ∈ IC .
We then have that∣∣∣∣ ddz p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ |f ′(||x∗(z)− y||)| ·
∣∣∣∣ ddz x∗(z)
∣∣∣∣+
|g′(||x∗(z)− z||)| ·
(∣∣∣∣ ddz x∗(z)
∣∣∣∣+ 1
)
< MfMz +Mg(Mz + 1).
Using a similar argument as given in the proof of Lemma 2, one can then show that for
M = MfMz +Mg(Mz + 1),
we have that∣∣∣∣∣δs
∑
z∈Cs
[
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
−
∫
z∈IC
[
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
dz
∣∣∣∣∣
< 2(MLC + 1)δs.
As by definition we have that
δs < δ,
it follows that∣∣∣∣∣δs
∑
z∈Cs
[
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
−
∫
z∈IC
[
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
dz
∣∣∣∣∣
< 2(MLC + 1)δ. (13)
Let δ0(LC),
0 < δ0(LC) <
∆U
4EpEq(MLC + 1)
be such that for all discrete interval communities on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC) we have that
||x∗δ(z)− x
∗(z)|| <
∆U
8EpEqLC(Mf +Mg)
, z ∈ R.
Note that such a δ0(LC) exists by Lemma 6. Using this choice of δ0(LC), it the follows from
Eq. (13) that for the error term given by Eq. (11) we have that∣∣∣∣∣δs
∑
z∈Cs
[
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
−
∫
z∈IC
[
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
dz
∣∣∣∣∣ < ∆U2EpEq ,
Therefore, in order to prove the lemma it remains to show that for the above choice of δ0(LC) we
obtain for the error term in Eq. (10) that
δs
∑
z∈Cs
∣∣∣p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x∗δ(z)|z)− p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)∣∣∣ < ∆U2EpEq .
As by construction we have for all discrete interval communities on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC)
that
||x∗δ(z)− x
∗(z)|| <
∆U
8EpEqLC(Mf +Mg)
, z ∈ R,
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it follows from Eq. (13) that
δs
∑
z∈Cs
∣∣∣p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x∗δ(z)|z)− p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)∣∣∣ < ∆U8EpEqLC
∑
z∈Cs
δs.
Note that we have that ∑
z∈Cs
δs < 2LC + δs.
As by assumption we have that
2LC > δs,
we obtain that ∑
z∈Cs
δs < 4LC
and
δs
∑
z∈Cs
∣∣∣p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x∗δ(z)|z)− p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)∣∣∣ < ∆U2EpEq .
The result of the lemma then follows.
The next lemma provides additional properties of the function F
(d)
Cδ
(y), y ∈ R.
Lemma 16. Consider constants Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and Eq , 0 < Eq , and an interval IC =
[mid(IC) − LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R. For every ∆U > 0 there exists a δ0(LC) > 0 such that for
all discrete interval communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC) the following is
true. Suppose that we have that
2LC < min{b, L}
where b is the constant of Assumption 1, as we well as
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd.
Then the function F
(d)
Cδ
(y) given by
F
(d)
Cδ
(y) = EpEq
∑
z∈Cs
[
p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x
∗
δ(z)|z)− c
]
, y ∈ R,
where
x∗δ(z) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|z)PCδ (x), z ∈ Cs,
and
PCδ (x) = Ep
∑
y∈Cd
p(x|y),
has the properties that
a) F
(d)
Cδ
(y) is differentiable in onR.
b) F
(d)
Cδ
(y) is strictly increasing on [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)−∆U ], and we have that
d
dy
F
(d)
Cδ
(y) > 0, y ∈ [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)−∆U ].
c) F
(d)
C (y) is strictly decreasing on [mid(IC) + ∆U ,mid(IC) + L), and we have that
d
dy
F
(d)
Cδ
(y) < 0, y ∈ [mid(IC) + ∆U ,mid(IC) + L).
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Proof. We first prove part a) of the lemma. To do this, we note that by Assumption 1 the function
p(x|y), x ∈ R, is differentiable in y for y ∈ R. Using this result, it then follows that the function
F
(d)
Cδ
(y) is differentiable in y onR.
We next prove part b) of the lemma. To do that, we consider the function F
(d)
C (y), y ∈ R, for the
interval community C = (IC , IC) given by
F
(d)
C (y) = EpEq
∫
z∈IC
[
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
dz,
where
x∗(z) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|z)PC(x), z ∈ IC .
From the analysis in [2] we have that the function F
(d)
C (y) is continuous on y and strictly increasing
in y on [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)). This implies that there exists a constant B > 0 such that
d
dy
F
(d)
C (y) > B, y ∈ [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)−∆U ].
Using this result, it follows that if we have that∣∣∣∣δs ddyF (d)Cδ (y)− ddyF (d)C (y)
∣∣∣∣ < B2 , y ∈ [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)−∆U ],
then we have that
δs
d
dy
F
(d)
Cδ
(y) >
B
2
, y ∈ [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)−∆U ],
and the function F
(d)
Cδ
(y) is strictly increasing on [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)−∆U ].
By Assumption 1 we have that the function f has bounded first and second derivatives, and we can
use a similar argument as given in proof of Lemma 2 to show that there exists a δ
(1)
0 > 0 such that
for all discrete interval communities on IC with distance δ < δ
(1)
0 we have that
δs
∑
z∈Cs
∣∣∣∣ ddy p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x∗δ(z)|z)− ddy p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)
∣∣∣∣ < B2EpEq
and∣∣∣∣∣δs
∑
z∈Cs
[ d
dy
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
−
∫
IC
[ d
dy
p(x∗(z)|y)q(x∗(z)|z)− c
]
dz
∣∣∣∣∣ < B2EpEq .
Note that this results establishes part b) of the lemma.
Using the same argument as given for part b), we can prove part c) of the lemma, i.e. prove that
there exists a δ
(2)
0 > 0 such that for all discrete interval communities on IC with distance δ < δ
(2)
0
we have that the F
(d)
C (y) is strictly decreasing on [mid(IC) +∆U ,mid(IC) +L) and we have that
d
dy
F
(d)
Cδ
(y) < 0, y ∈ [mid(IC) + ∆U ,mid(IC) + L).
The result of the lemma then follows by setting
δ0(LC) = min
{
δ
(1)
0 , δ
(2)
0
}
.
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J.1 Proof of Proposition 6
We are now in the position to prove Proposition 6. Recall that Proposition 6 characterizes the content
consumption utility rate function U
(d)
Cδ
(y) for a discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) that is
part of a ǫ−equilibrium as given by Proposition 1.
We obtain the result of Proposition 6 using the results of Lemma 16 as follows. Let(
C, {α∗C(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
be a ǫ−equilibrium as given by Proposition 1. Then we have
that for every discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C that
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and
LC <
L
2
,
where LC is the length of the interval IC such that
Cd = A
(d) ∩ IC .
Furthermore, for a discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C as given by Proposition 1 we
have that
U
(d)
Cδ
(y) = EpEq
∑
z∈Cs
[
p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x
∗
δ(z)|z)− c
]
, y ∈ Cd,
where
x∗δ(z) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|z)PCδ (x), z ∈ Cs,
and
PCδ (x) = Ep
∑
y∈Cd
p(x|y).
As a result, the properties of a discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C satisfy the assump-
tions in Lemma 16 and we have that
U
(d)
Cδ
(y) = F
(d)
Cδ
(y) = EpEq
∑
z∈Cs
[
p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x
∗
δ(z)|z)− c
]
, y ∈ Cd,
where the function F
(d)
Cδ
(y) is as given in Lemma 16. Proposition then follows immediately from
Lemma 16.
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K Proof of Proposition 7
In this appendix we prove Proposition 7. To do this, we first study for a given discrete interval
communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs) the properties of the function F
(d)
Cδ
(y) given by
F
(s)
Cδ
(y) = Eq[q(x
∗
δ(y)|y)PCδ (x
∗
δ(y)− αCδc], x ∈ R,
where Eq, 0 < Eq , is the bound on the content production rate of agent y ∈ A(d), PCδ (x) is the
demand function given by
PCδ (x) = Ep
∑
y∈Cd
p(x|y),
as well as
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x)
and
αCδ =
∑
y∈Cd
Ep.
Our first lemma shows that δdF
(s)
Cδ
(y) closely approximates the function F
(d)
C (y) that we used for
our analysis of interval communities C = (IC , IC) in [2]. More precisely, we have the following
result.
Lemma 17. Consider constants Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and Eq , 0 < Eq , and an interval IC =
[mid(IC) − LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R. For every ∆U > 0 there exists a δ0(LC) > 0 such that for
all discrete interval communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC) the following is
true. If we have that
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and
2LC < min{b, L}
where b is the constant of Assumption 1, then the function F
(s)
Cδ
(y) given by
F
(s)
Cδ
(y) = Eq
[
q
(
x∗δ(y)|y
)
PCδ(x
∗
δ(y))− αCδc
]
, y ∈ R,
where
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x)
and
αCδ =
∑
y∈Cd
Ep,
has the property that ∣∣∣δdF (s)Cδ (y)− F (d)C (y)
∣∣∣ < ∆U , y ∈ IC ,
where
F
(d)
C (y) = Eq
[
q
(
x∗(y)|y
)
PC(x
∗(y))− αCc
]
with
x∗(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PC(x)
and
αC = 2LCEp.
Proof. LetMf andMg be such that
|f ′(x)| < Mf , x ∈ [0, L]
and
|g′(x)| < Mg, x ∈ supp(g(·)).
Note that such constantsMf andMg exist by Assumption 1.
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We then have that∣∣∣∣ ddxPC(x)
∣∣∣∣ =
∫
y∈IC
αC(y)
∣∣∣∣ ddxp(x|y)
∣∣∣∣ dy < Ep
∫
y∈IC
Mfdy = Ep2LCMf .
Let
BP = 2EpLCMf
and
B = max
{
PC
(
mid(IC)
)
Mg, BP
}
.
Using this definition, let δ0(LC),
0 < δ0(LC) <
∆U
16EpEqc
,
be such that for all discrete interval communities on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC), we have that
||x∗(y)− x∗δ(y)|| <
∆U
4EqB
, y ∈ R,
and ∣∣PC(x∗δ(y))− δdPδ,C(x∗δ(y))∣∣ < ∆U4Eq , y ∈ R.
Note that such a δ0(LC) exists by Lemma 2 and Lemma 6.
Then we have for y ∈ R that∣∣∣PC(x∗(y))q(x∗(y)|y)− δdPCδ (x∗δ(y))q(x∗δ (y)|y)∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣PC(x∗(y))q(x∗(y)|y)− PC(x∗δ(y))q(x∗δ(y)|y)∣∣∣+ · · ·
+
∣∣∣PC(x∗δ(y))q(x∗δ (y)|y)− δdPCδ (x∗δ(y))q(x∗δ(y|y)∣∣∣
≤ q(x∗(y)|y)
∣∣∣PC(x∗(y))− PC(x∗δ(y))∣∣∣+ · · ·
+PC(x
∗(y))
∣∣∣q(x∗(y)|y)− q(x∗δ(y)|y)∣∣∣+ · · ·
+q(x∗δ(y)|y)|PC(x
∗
δ(y)− δdPCδ (x
∗
δ(y))|
≤
∣∣PC(x∗(y))− PC(x∗δ(y))∣∣ + · · ·
+PC(x
∗(y))
∣∣∣q(x∗(y)|y)− q(x∗δ(y)|y)∣∣∣+ · · ·
+
∣∣PC(x∗δ(y)− δdPCδ(x∗δ(y))∣∣
< BP ||x
∗(y)− x∗δ(y)||+ · · ·
+PC
(
mid(IC)
)
Mg||x
∗(y)− x∗δ(y)||+ · · ·
+
∣∣PC(x∗δ(y)− δdPCδ(x∗δ(y))∣∣,
where we used the result from the analysis in [2] which states that
mid(IC) = argmax
x∈R
PC(x).
By construction we have for δ < δ0(LC) that
BP ||x
∗(y)− x∗δ(y)||
+PC
(
mid(IC)
)
Mg||x
∗(y)− x∗δ(y)||
+
∣∣PC(x∗δ(y)− δdPCδ(x∗δ(y))∣∣
< B
∆U
4EqB
+B
∆U
4EqB
+
∆U
4Eq
=
3
4
∆U
Eq
.
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Recall that we have that
αC = 2LCEp
and
δdαCδ = δd
∑
y∈Cd
Ep = 2L(Cδ)Ep + δdEp = 2Ep
[
L(Cδ) + δd/2
]
.
Combining the above result with the fact that∣∣LC − L(Cd)∣∣ ≤ δd
and
0 < δ < δ0(LC) <
∆U
16EpEqc
,
we obtain for y ∈ R that∣∣∣δdF (s)Cδ (y)− F (d)C (y)
∣∣∣
≤ Eq
∣∣∣PC(x∗)q(x∗(y)|y)− δdPCδ (x∗δ(y))q(x∗δ (y)|y)∣∣∣+ · · ·
+Eqc
∣∣αC − δdαCδ ∣∣
< Eq
3
4
∆U
Eq
+ EqEpc2
∣∣∣LC − L(Cd)− δd/2∣∣∣
≤
3
4
∆U + 2EqEpc
∣∣∣LC − L(Cd)− δd/2∣∣∣
≤
3
4
∆U + 2EqEpcδd + EqEpc
<
3
4
∆U + 4EqEpcδd
As by definition we have that
δd < δ
and by construction we have that
0 < δ < δ0(LC) <
∆U
16EpEqc
,
it follows from the above result that∣∣∣δdF (s)Cδ (y)− F (d)C (y)
∣∣∣
<
3
4
∆U + 4EqEpcδ
<
3
4
∆U + 4EqEpc
∆U
16EqEpc
= ∆U .
The result of the lemma then follows.
The next two lemmas provide additional properties of the function F
(s)
Cδ
(y), y ∈ R.
Lemma 18. Consider constants Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and Eq , 0 < Eq , and an interval IC =
[mid(IC) − LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R. For every ∆U , 0 < ∆U < LC there exists a δ0(LC) > 0
such that for all discrete interval communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC), the
following is true. If we have that
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and
2LC < min{b, L}
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where b is the constant of Assumption 1, then the function F
(s)
Cδ
(y) given by
F
(s)
Cδ
(y) = Eq
[
q
(
x∗δ(y)|y
)
PCδ(x
∗
δ(y))− αCδc
]
, y ∈ R,
where
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x)
and
αCδ =
∑
y∈Cd
Ep,
has the properties that
a) F
(s)
Cδ
(y) is strictly increasing and twice continuously differentiable on [mid(IC) −
LC ,mid(IC)−∆U ], and we have that
d
dy
F
(s)
Cδ
(y) > 0, y ∈ [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC)−∆U ].
b) F
(s)
Cδ
(y) is strictly decreasing and twice continuously differentiable on [mid(IC) +
∆U ,mid(IC) + LC ], and we have that
d
dy
F
(s)
Cδ
(y) < 0, y ∈ [mid(IC) + ∆U ,mid(IC) + LC ].
Proof. We prove part a) of the lemma. Part b) can be shown using the same argument.
Let
y0 = mid(IC),
and let
yl = mid(IC)−∆U .
Using these definitions, let δ0(LC) > 0 be such that for all discrete interval communities on IC with
distance δ < δ0(LC) we have that
a) there exists a unique solution to the optimization problem
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x), y ∈ [y0 − LC , y0 −∆U ]
and x∗δ(y) is twice continuously differentiable on [y0 − LC , y0 −∆U ].
b) x∗δ(yl) < y0 and
x∗δ(y) ∈ [y, x
∗(yl)], y ∈ [y0 − LC , y0 −∆U ].
c) the function PCδ(x) is increasing and strictly concave on [y0 − LC , y0 − x
∗
δ(yl)].
Note that such a δ0(LC) exists by Lemma 4 and 7.
Using this construction, we show next that for
0 < δ < δ0(LC)
the function F
(s)
Cδ
(y) is strictly increasing and twice continuously differentiable on [y0 − LC , yl]
To do this, we use the fact that by construction there exists a unique solution to the optimization
problem
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x), y ∈ [y0 − LC , y0 −∆U ],
and we have that
x∗δ(y) ∈ [y, x
∗(yl)], y ∈ [y0 − LC , y0 −∆U ]
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with
x∗δ(yl) < y0.
Furthermore, by construction the function PCδ (x) is increasing and strictly concave on [y0 −
LC , y0−x∗δ(yl)]. Using these properties, we can show that the functionF
(s)
Cδ
(y) is strictly increasing
and twice continuously differentiable for
y ∈ [y0 − LC , y0 −∆U ],
using the same argument as given in [2] to show that the function F
(s)
C (y) is strictly increasing and
twice continuously differentiable for
y ∈ [y0 − LC , y0].
The result of the lemma then follows.
Lemma 19. Consider constants Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and Eq , 0 < Eq , and an interval IC =
[mid(IC) − LC ,mid(IC) + LC) ⊂ R. For every ∆U , 0 < ∆U < LC there exists a δ0(LC) > 0
such that for all discrete interval communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ < δ0(LC), the
following is true. If we have that
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and
2LC < min{b, L}
where b is the constant of Assumption 1, then the function F
(s)
Cδ
(y) given by
F
(s)
Cδ
(y) = Eq
[
q
(
x∗δ(y)|y
)
PCδ(x
∗
δ(y))− αCδc
]
, y ∈ R,
where
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x)
and
αCδ =
∑
y∈Cd
Ep,
has the properties that
a) F
(s)
Cδ
(y) is non-decreasing on [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)− LC ].
b) F
(s)
Cδ
(y) is non-increasing on [mid(IC) + LC ,mid(IC) + L).
Proof. We prove part a) of the lemma. Part b) can be shown using the same argument.
Let
yl = mid(IC)− LC .
Furthermore, let δ0(LC) > 0 be such that for all discrete interval communities on IC with distance
δ < δ0(LC) we have that
a) there exists a unique solution to the optimization problem
x∗δ(yl) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x),
and
x∗δ(yl) < mid(IC),
b) the function PCδ (x) is strictly concave on [mid(IC)−LC ,mid(IC)−x
∗
δ(yl)] and increas-
ing on [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)− LC ],
c) for
y ∈ [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)− LC ],
we have
x∗δ(y) ≤ x
∗
δ(yl), y ∈ [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)− LC ].
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Note that such a δ0(LC) exists by Lemma 4, 7 and 8.
Using the fact that by construction we have that
x∗δ(y) ≤ x
∗
δ(yl) < mid(IC), y ∈ [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)− LC ],
and that the functionPCδ (x) is strictly concave on [mid(IC)−LC,mid(IC)−x
∗
δ(yl)] and increasing
on [mid(IC) − L,mid(IC) − LC ], we can show that the function F
(s)
Cδ
(y) is non-decreasing on
[mid(IC) − L,mid(IC) − LC ] using the same argument as given in [2] to show that the function
F
(s)
C (y) is non-decreasing on [mid(IC)− L,mid(IC)− LC ].
The result of the lemma then follows.
K.1 Proof of Proposition 7
We are now in the position to prove Proposition 7. Recall that Proposition 7 characterizes the content
production utility rate function U
(s)
Cδ
(y) for a discrete interval communityCδ = (Cd, Cs) that is part
of a ǫ−equilibrium as given by Proposition 1.
We obtain the result of Proposition 7 using the results of Lemma 18 as follows. Let(
C, {α∗C(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
be a ǫ−equilibrium as given by Proposition 1. Then we have
that for every discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C that
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and
LC <
L
2
,
where LC is the length of the interval IC such that
Cd = A
(d) ∩ IC .
Furthermore, for a discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C as given by Proposition 1 we
have that
U
(d)
Cδ
(y) = EpEq
∑
z∈Cs
[
p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x
∗
δ(z)|z)− c
]
, y ∈ Cd,
where
x∗δ(z) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|z)PCδ (x), z ∈ Cs,
and
PCδ (x) = Ep
∑
y∈Cd
p(x|y).
As a result, the properties of a discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C satisfy the assump-
tions in Lemma 18 and we have that
U
(d)
Cδ
(y) = F
(d)
Cδ
(y) = EpEq
∑
z∈Cs
[
p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x
∗
δ(z)|z)− c
]
, y ∈ Cd,
where the function F
(d)
Cδ
(y) is as given in Lemma 18. Proposition then follows immediately from
Lemma 18.
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L Optimal Community Selection for Content Consumers and Producers
In Appendices C and H, we derived for a given discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) the
properties of content demand function PCδ (x) given by
PCδ(x) =
∑
y∈Cd
αCδ(y)p(xy)
and content supplyQ∗Cδ(x) given by
Q∗Cδ(x) =
∑
y∈Cs
β∗Cδ (x|y)q(x|y),
under the assumptions that
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and
||β∗Cδ(·|y)|| = Eq, y ∈ Cs,
where
β∗Cδ (·|y) = argmax
βCδ (·|y):||βCδ (·|y)||≤Eq
∫
x∈R
βCδ(x|y)
[
q(x|y)PCδ (x)− αCδc
]
dx
and
αCδ =
∑
y∈Cd
Ep.
Or in other words we derived for a given discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) the properties
of content demand function PCδ (x) and content supply Q
∗
Cδ
(x) under the assumptions that agents
y ∈ Cd, y ∈ Cs in community C allocate all their production and consumption rate to community
C. In this appendix we show that this is indeed optimal for an agent to allocate its production and
consumption rate to a single community.
To do this, we consider a given community structure S =
(
C, {αC(y)}y∈A(d) , {βC(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
as
defined in Section 4.2; in particular, we have that C defines the set of communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs),
Cd ⊂ A
(d) and Cs ⊂ A
(s),
of the community structure S, and
αC(y) = {αCδ(y)}Cδ∈C , y ∈ A
(d),
and
βC(y) = {βCδ(·|y)}Cδ∈C , y ∈ A
(s),
indicate the rates that content consumers and producers allocate to the different communities Cδ ∈
C. We assume that the total content consumption and production rates of each agent can not exceed
a given threshold, and we have that
||αC(y)|| =
∑
Cδ∈C
αCδ(y) ≤ Ep, y ∈ A
(d),
and
||βC(y)|| =
∑
Cδ∈C
||βCδ(·|y)|| ≤ Eq, y ∈ A
(s),
where
||βCδ (·|y)|| =
∫
x∈R
βCδ(x|y)dx.
More precisely, given a community structure S =
(
C, {αC(y)}y∈A(d) , {βC(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
, we analyze
in the following the situation where an agent y ∈ A(d) changes its rate allocation αC(y) to αC′(y)
given by
αC
′(y) = {αCδ
′(y)}Cδ∈C ,
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where αCδ
′(y) is the rate for content consumption allocated to community Cδ ∈ C such that∑
Cδ∈C
αCδ
′(y) ≤ Ep.
In particular, we want to analyze whether this change will increase the utility for contention con-
sumption of agent y, assuming that all other agents keep their rate allocation fixed. Given a commu-
nity structure S =
(
C, {αC(y)}y∈A(d) , {βC(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
, let U
(d)
Sδ
(αC
′(y)|y) be the utility that agent
y ∈ A(d) receives under the new allocation αC′(y), while all other agents keep their rate allocation
fixed, i.e. we have that
U
(d)
Sδ
(αC
′(y)|y) =
∑
Cδ∈C
αCδ
′(y)
∫
R
[
p(x|y)QCδ (x)− βCδ(x)c
]
dx
with
QCδ(x) =
∑
z∈A(s)
q(x|z)βCδ (x|z)
and
βCδ(x) =
∑
z∈A(s)
βCδ(x|z).
Similarly, given a community structure S =
(
C, {αC(y)}y∈A(d) , {βC(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
, we want to ana-
lyze the situation where an agent y ∈ A(s) changes its rate allocation βC(y) to βC
′(y) given by
βC
′(y) = {βCδ
′(·|y)}Cδ∈C ,
where βCδ
′(·|y) is the rate allocated for content production in community Cδ ∈ C such that
||βC
′d(y)|| ≤ Eq.
Again, we analyze whether this change will increase the utility for contention consumption of agent
y, assuming that all other agents keep their rate allocation fixed. Given a community structure
S =
(
C, {αC(y)}y∈A(d) , {βC(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
, let U
(s)
Sδ
(βC
′(y)|y) be the utility that agent y receives
under the new allocation βC
′(y), while all other agents keep their rate allocation fixed, i.e. we have
that
U
(s)
Sδ
(βC
′(y)|y) =
∑
Cδ∈C
∫
R
βCδ
′(x|y)
[
q(x|y)PCδ (x)− αCδc
]
dx
with
PCδ (x) =
∑
z∈A(d)
αCδ(z)p(x|y)
and
αCδ =
∑
z∈A(d)
αCδ (z).
Our first result states that it is indeed optimal for agent y ∈ A(d) to allocate all its con-
tent consumption rate to a single community. That is, given a community structure S =(
C, {αC(y)}y∈A(d) , {βC(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
there exists a community
C∗δ (y) ∈ C
such that an optimal rate allocation αC
∗(y),
α∗C(y) = arg max
αC′(y):||αC′(y)||≤Ep
U
(d)
Sδ
(αC
′(y)|y), y ∈ A(d),
is given by
α∗Cδ(y) =
{
Ep, Cδ = C
∗
δ (y)
0, Cδ 6= C∗δ (y).
Or in other words, given a community structure S =
(
C, {αC(y)}y∈A(d) , {βC(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
there
exists an optimal rate allocation αC
∗(y) for agent y ∈ A(d) such that y allocates all its rate to a
single community C∗δ ∈ C.
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Lemma 20. Let
(
C, {αC(y)}y∈A(d) , {βC(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
be a given community structure, and let y ∈
A(d) be a given content consumer, and let Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, be a positive scalar. If we have that
max
Cδ∈C
∫
x∈R
[
p(x|y)QCδ (x)− βCδ (x)c
]
> 0,
then an optimal content consumption rate allocation αC
∗(y),
α∗C(y) = arg max
αC′(y):||αC′(y)||≤Ep
U
(d)
Sδ
(αC
′(y)|y),
for agent y is given by
α∗Cδ(y) =
{
Ep, Cδ = C
∗
δ (y)
0, Cδ 6= C∗δ (y),
where
C∗δ (y) = arg max
Cδ∈C
∫
x∈R
[
p(x|y)QCδ(x) − βCδ(x)c
]
.
Proof. This lemma can be proved using the same argument as given in [2] where we proved the
same result for community structures S = (C, {αC(y)}y∈R, {βC(·|y)}y∈R) under the continuous
agent model.
Similarly, the next result states that it is optimal for an agent y ∈ A(s) to allocate all its
content production rate to a single community. That is, given a community structure S =(
C, {αC(y)}y∈A(d) , {βC(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
there exists a community
C∗δ (y) ∈ C
such that an optimal rate allocation βC
∗(y),
β∗C(y) = arg max
βC
′(y):||βC′(y)||≤Eq
U
(s)
Sδ
(βC
′(y)|y), y ∈ A(d),
is given by
||β∗Cδ (y)|| =
{
Eq, Cδ = C
∗
δ (y)
0, Cδ 6= C∗δ (y).
Or in other words, given a community structure S =
(
C, {αC(y)}y∈A(d) , {βC(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
there
exists an optimal rate allocation βC
∗(y) for agent y ∈ A(s) such that y allocates all its rate to a
single community C∗δ ∈ C.
Lemma 21. Let
(
C, {αC(y)}y∈A(d) , {βC(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
be a given community structure, and let y ∈
A(s) be a given content producer, and let Eq > 0 be a positive scalar. If we have that
max
Cδ∈C
[
q(x∗Cδ (y)|y)PCδ (x)− αCδc
]
> 0
where
x∗Cδ (y) = argmaxx∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x),
then an optimal content consumption rate allocation αC
∗(y),
β∗C(y) = arg max
βC
′(y):||βC′(y)||≤Eq
U
(s)
Sδ
(βC
′(y)|y),
for agent y is given by
β∗Cδ(x|y) =
{
Eqδ(x
∗
δ,Cδ
(y)− x), Cδ = C∗δ (y)
0, otherwise,
where
C∗δ (y) = arg max
Cδ∈C
q(x∗Cδ (y)|y)PCδ (x
∗
C,y)
and δ(·) is the Dirac delta function.
Proof. This lemma can be proved using the same argument as given in [2] where we proved the
same result for community structures S = (C, {αC(y)}y∈R, {βC(·|y)}y∈R) under the continuous
agent model.
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M Proof of Proposition 1
In this appendix we prove Proposition 1. To do that, we make a connection with the analysis for the
continuous agent model in [2]. In [2] we showed that there always exists a Nash equilibrium under
the continuous model. Our next results states that for each Nash equilibrium that we obtained in [2]
there exists a corresponding ǫ−equilibrium for the two-sided model, given that the distances δd and
δs that define the agent sets A(d) and A(s) are small enough. More precisely we have the following
result.
Lemma 22. Suppose that
f(0)g(0)− c > 0.
Furthermore let Ep, 0 < Ep ≤ 1, and Eq , 0 < Eq , be given positive scalars, and let
S∗ = (C, {α∗C(y)}y∈R, {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈R) be a Nash equilibrium as given in [2]. That is, the Nash
equilibrium (C, {α∗C(y)}y∈R, {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈R) has the properties that
(a) each community C = (IC , IC) ∈ C is an interval community where the interval IC ⊂ R is
given by
IC = [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC) + LC).
(b) the set {IC}C∈C is a set of mutually non-overlapping intervals that coversR, i.e. we have
that
IC ∩ IC′ = ∅, C, C
′ ∈ C, C 6= C′,
and
∪C∈CIC = R.
(c) there exists a constant LI > 0 such that
LC = LI , C ∈ C∗
where
2LI < min{b, L}
and b is the constant of Assumption 1.
Furthermore, for each community C = (IC , IC) ∈ C we have that
(a) α∗C(y) = Ep, y ∈ IC .
(b) β∗C(·|y) = Eqδ(x
∗(y)− x), y ∈ IC , where δ is the Dirac delta function and x∗(y) is given
by
x∗(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PC(x)
with
PC(x) = Ep
∫
IC
p(x|y)dy.
(c) U
(d)
C (y) = EpEq
∫
IC
[
q(x∗(z)|y)p(x∗(z)|y)− c
]
dz > 0, y ∈ IC .
(d) U
(s)
C (y) = Eq
[
q(x∗(y)|y)PC(x∗(y)− αCc
]
> 0, y ∈ IC , where
αC = 2LCEp.
Then for every ǫ > 0 there exists a δ0(LC) > 0 such that for all discrete agent sets A(d) and A(s)
with
0 < δd, δs < δ0(LC),
the following discrete interval community structure S∗δ =
(
Cδ, {α∗Cδ(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
Cδ
(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
is a ǫ-relative Nash equilibrium with
U
(d)
S∗ (y) > 0, y ∈ A
(d),
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and
U
(s)
S∗ (y) > 0, y ∈ A
(s),
where U
(d)
S∗ (y) and U
(s)
S∗ (y) are the utility rates for content consumption, and production, under the
discrete community structure S∗δ =
(
Cδ, {α∗Cδ(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
Cδ
(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
.
The discrete interval community structure S∗δ =
(
Cδ, {α∗Cδ(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
Cδ
(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
is given
as follows. If there exists a community C = (IC , IC) in the Nash equilibrium S∗ =
(C, {α∗C(y)}y∈R, {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈R) under the continuous model, then the discrete interval community
Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ given by
Cd = Cd = A
(d) ∩ IC
and
Cs = Cs = A
(s) ∩ IC ,
exists in the community structure S∗δ =
(
Cδ, {α∗Cδ (y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
Cδ
(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
.
Furthermore, for a discrete interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C we have that
αCδ (y) = Ep, y ∈ Cd,
and
βCδ(x|y) = Eqδ(x
∗
δ(y)− x), y ∈ Cs,
where
x∗δ(y) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|y)PCδ (x).
Before we prove Lemma 22, we make the following observation. In [2] we showed that there always
exists a Nash equilibrium S∗ = (C, {α∗C(y)}y∈R, {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈R) as given in in the statement of
Lemma 22. Furthermore, the ǫ−equilibrium S∗δ =
(
Cδ, {α
∗
Cδ
(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
Cδ
(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
given
in the statement of the Lemma 22 has the same properties as the ǫ−equilibrium in Proposition 1.
As a result, we have that Proposition 1 follows immediately from Lemma 22. Or in other words,
proving Lemma 22 is sufficient to prove Proposition 1.
Proof. Let (C, {α∗C(y)}y∈R, {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈R) be a Nash equilibrium as given in the statement of
the lemma. From the analysis in [2] we have for all communities C = (IC , IC) ∈ C that
the functions U
(d)
C (y) and U
(s)
C (y) are continuous and symmetric with respect to mid(IC) on
[mid(IC) − LC ,mid(IC) + LC ]. Furthermore, by Property (a) in the statement of the lemma,
we have we have for all communitiesC = (IC , IC) ∈ C that
IC = [mid(IC)− LC ,mid(IC) + LC).
Combining these two results, it follows that there exists a∆U ,
0 < ∆U ,
such that for all communitiesC = (IC , IC) ∈ C we have that
U
(d)
C (y) > 2∆U > 0, y ∈ IC ,
and
U
(s)
C (y) > 2∆U > 0, y ∈ IC .
Let δ0(LC) > O be a positive scalar such that the following is true. For each interval community
C = (IC , IC) ∈ C in the Nash equilibriumS∗ given in the statement of the lemma, and each discrete
interval community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) on IC with distance δ such that
0 < δ < δ0(LC),
we have that ∣∣∣δsF (d)Cδ (y)− F (d)C (y)
∣∣∣ < min{ ǫ
2
,∆U
}
, y ∈ R
and ∣∣∣δdF (s)Cδ (y)− F (s)C (y)
∣∣∣ < min{ ǫ
2
,∆U
}
, y ∈ R,
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where the functions F
(d)
Cδ
(y), F
(d)
C (y, and F
(s)
Cδ
(y) and F
(s)
C (y), are as defined in Section J and K.
Note that that such a δ0(LC) exists by Lemma 15 and 17. Furthermore, from the analysis in [2] we
have for each community C = (IC , IC ∈ S∗ that
U
(d)
C (y) = F
(d)
C (y), y ∈ IC ,
and
U
(s)
C (y) = F
(s)
C (y), y ∈ IC .
It then follows that if the sets A(d) andA(s) are such that
0 < δd, δs < δ0(LC),
then we have for all communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C in the discrete interval community structure
S∗δ =
(
Cδ, {α∗Cδ(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
Cδ
(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
given in the statement of the lemma that
U
(d)
Cδ
(y) = F
(d)
Cδ
(y) = EpEq
∑
z∈Cd
[
p(x∗δ(z)|y)q(x
∗
δ(z)|z)− c
]
dz > ∆U > 0, y ∈ Cd,
where
x∗δ(z) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|z)PCδ (x),
and
U
(s)
Cδ
(y) = F
(s)
Cδ
(y) = Eq
[
q
(
x∗δ(y)|y
)
PCδ(x
∗
δ(y))− αCδc
]
> ∆U > 0, y ∈ Cs,
where
αCδ =
∑
y∈Cd
Ep.
Let Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C be a community in the community structure(
Cδ, {α∗Cδ (y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
Cδ
(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
as given in the statement of the lemma. By defini-
tion,
Furthermore, by the definition we have for the the discrete interval community structure S∗δ =(
Cδ, {α∗Cδ (y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
Cδ
(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
given in the statement of the lemma that for the fol-
lowing is true. Let Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C be a community in the community structure(
Cδ, {α
∗
Cδ
(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
Cδ
(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
, then for all agents y ∈ Cd we have that
αC′
δ
(y) = 0, C′δ ∈ C, C
′
δ 6= Cδ
and
||βC′
δ
(·|y)|| = 0, C′δ ∈ C, C
′
δ 6= Cδ.
It then follows that
U
(d)
S∗
δ
(y) = U
(d)
Cδ
(y), y ∈ Cd
and
U
(s)
S∗
δ
(y) = U
(s)
Cδ
(y), y ∈ Cs.
Combining the above results, we obtain that for the discrete interval community structure S∗δ =(
Cδ, {α
∗
Cδ
(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
Cδ
(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
given in the statement of the lemma we have
U
(d)
S∗
δ
(y) > 0, y ∈ A(d),
and
U
(s)
S∗
δ
(y) > 0, y ∈ A(s).
In order to prove the lemma, it then remains to show that the discrete interval community structure
S∗δ =
(
Cδ, {α∗Cδ(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
Cδ
(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
is a ǫ−equilibrium , i.e. we have to show that
a)
U
(d)
S∗
δ
(αCδ (y)|y)− U
(d)
S∗
δ
(y) < ǫ, y ∈ Cd.
where
αCδ(y) = arg max
αC′(y):||αC′(y)||≤Ep
U
(d)
S∗
δ
(αC
′(y)|y),
and
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b)
U
(s)
S∗
δ
(βC(y)|y)− U
(s)
S∗
δ
(y) < ǫ, y ∈ Cs.
where
βCδ (y) = arg max
βC
′(y):||βC′(y)||≤Eq
U
(s)
S∗
δ
(βC
′(y)|y).
As by definition, we have for all communitiesCδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C in the discrete interval community
structure
(
Cδ, {α∗Cδ(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
Cδ
(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
as given in the statement of the lemma for all
agents y ∈ Cd we have that
αC′
δ
(y) = 0, C′δ ∈ C, C
′
δ 6= Cδ
and
||βC′
δ
(·|y)|| = 0, C′δ ∈ C, C
′
δ 6= Cδ,
this is equivalent to show that for each community Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C in the community structure(
Cδ, {α∗Cδ (y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
Cδ
(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
given in the statement of the lemma, we have that
a)
U
(d)
S∗
δ
(αCδ (y)|y)− U
(d)
Cδ
(y) < ǫ, y ∈ Cd.
where
αC(y) = arg max
αC′(y):||αC′(y)||≤Ep
U
(d)
S∗
δ
(αC
′(y)|y),
and
b)
U
(s)
S∗
δ
(βC(y)|y)− U
(s)
Cδ
(y) < ǫ, y ∈ Cs.
where
βC(y) = arg max
βC
′(y):||βC′(y)||≤Eq
U
(s)
S∗
δ
(βC
′(y)|y).
We first prove property that for all communities Cδ = (Cd, Cs) ∈ C we have
U
(d)
S∗
δ
(αCδ (y)|y)− U
(d)
Cδ
(y) < ǫ, y ∈ Cd.
To do this, we consider a given community C˜δ = (C˜d, C˜s) ∈ C in the discrete interval community
structure
(
Cδ, {α∗Cδ(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
Cδ
(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
, and a given agent y˜ ∈ C˜d. In order to prove the
above result, it suffices to show for the given community C˜δ and given agent y˜ we have that
U
(d)
S∗
δ
(αCδ (y˜)|y˜)− U
(d)
C˜δ
(y˜) < ǫ.
By Lemma 20, we have that
αC(y˜) = arg max
αC′(y˜):||αC′(y˜)||≤Ep
U
(d)
S∗
δ
(αC(y˜)|y˜)
is given by
αCδ(y˜) =
{
Ep, Cδ = C
∗
δ (y˜)
0, Cδ 6= C∗δ (y˜),
where
C∗δ (y˜) = arg max
Cδ∈C
∫
x∈R
[
p(x|y˜)QCδ(x)− βCδ (x)c
]
and
QCδ(x) =
∑
z∈Cs
βCδ(x|z)q(x|z).
To simplify the notation let
C∗δ = C
∗
δ (y˜),
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and let Ck,d and Ck,s be the set of agents that consume and produce content in C
∗
δ , i.e. we have that
C∗δ = C
∗
δ (y˜) = (Ck,d, Ck,s) .
It then follows that
U
(d)
S∗
δ
(αCδ (y˜)|y˜) = F
(d)
C∗
δ
(y˜) = EpEq
∑
z∈Ck,s
[
p(x∗δ(z)|y˜)q(x
∗
δ (z)|z)− c
]
dx,
where
x∗δ(z) = argmax
x∈R
q(x|z)Pδ,C∗
δ
(x).
Let the interval community C = (IC , IC) in the Nash equilibrium (C, {α∗C(y)}y∈R, {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈R)
given in the statement of the lemma be such that for the given C˜δ = (C˜d, C˜s) ∈ C we have that
C˜d = A
(d) ∩ IC
and
C˜s = A
(s) ∩ IC .
Furthermore, let the interval community C∗ = (IC∗ , IC∗) in the Nash equilibrium
(C, {α∗C(y)}y∈R, {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈R) given in the statement of the lemma be such that for the community
C∗δ = C
∗
δ (y˜) = (Ck,d, Ck,s)
we have that
Ck,d = A
(d) ∩ IC∗ ,
and
Ck,s = A
(s) ∩ IC∗ .
Note that such interval communities C = (IC , IC) and C
∗ = (IC∗ , IC∗) by the construction of the
community structure
(
Cδ, {α∗Cδ (y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
Cδ
(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
given in the statement of the lemma.
Using these definition, we then have that for the given community C˜δ and given agent y˜ that
δs
(
U
(d)
S∗
δ
(αCδ (y˜)|y˜)− U
(d)
C˜δ
(y˜)
)
= δsU
(d)
S∗
δ
(αCδ (y˜)|y˜)− F
(d)
C∗ (y˜) + · · · (14)
F
(d)
C∗ (y˜)− F
(d)
C (y˜) + · · ·
F
(d)
C (y˜)− δsU
(d)
C˜δ
(y˜)
= δsF
(d)
C∗
δ
(y˜)− F
(d)
C∗ (y˜) + · · ·
F
(d)
C∗ (y˜)− F
(d)
C (y˜) + · · ·
F
(d)
C (y˜)− δsF
(d)
C˜δ
(y˜)
By the properties of a Nash equilibrium as defined in [2], we have for each communityC = (IC , IC)
in the Nash equilibrium (C, {α∗C(y)}y∈R, {β
∗
C(·|y)}y∈R) given in the statement of the lemma that
F
(d)
C (y) ≥ F
(d)
C′ (y), y ∈ IC , C
′ ∈ C.
It then follows that in Eq. (14) we have
F
(d)
C∗ (y˜)− F
(d)
C (y˜) ≤ 0,
and we obtain that
δs
(
U
(d)
S∗
δ
(αCδ (y˜)|y˜)− U
(d)
C˜δ
(y˜)
)
≤
∣∣∣δsF (d)C∗
δ
(y˜)− F
(d)
C∗ (y˜)
∣∣∣+ · · ·∣∣∣F (d)C (y˜)− δsF (d)C˜δ (y˜)
∣∣∣.
By construction we have for
0 < δ < δ0(LC)
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that ∣∣∣δsF (d)C∗
δ
(y˜)− F
(d)
C∗ (y˜)
∣∣∣ < ǫ
2
and ∣∣∣F (d)C (y˜)− δsF (d)Cδ (y˜)
∣∣∣ < ǫ
2
.
Combining the above results, we obtain that
δs
(
U
(d)
S∗
δ
(αCδ (y˜)|y˜)− U
(d)
Cδ
(y˜)
)
≤
∣∣∣δsF (d)C∗
δ
(y˜)− F
(d)
C∗ (y˜)
∣∣∣+ · · ·∣∣∣F (d)C (y˜)− δsF (d)Cδ (y˜)
∣∣∣
< 2
ǫ
2
= ǫ,
and
U
(d)
S∗
δ
(βCδ (y˜)|y)− U
(d)
S∗
δ
(y˜) < ǫ, y ∈ Cd.
It then follows that for community structure S∗δ =
(
Cδ, {α∗Cδ(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
Cδ
(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
given in
the statement of the lemma we have
U
(d)
S∗
δ
(αCδ (y)|y)− U
(d)
S∗
δ
(y) < ǫ, y ∈ A(d).
Using the same line of argument, we can show that for community structure S∗δ =(
Cδ, {α∗Cδ (y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
Cδ
(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
given in the statement of the lemma we have
U
(s)
S∗
δ
(βCδ (y)|y)− U
(s)
S∗
δ
(y) < ǫ, y ∈ A(s).
It then follows that the community structure S∗δ =
(
Cδ, {α∗Cδ(y)}y∈A(d) , {β
∗
Cδ
(·|y)}y∈A(s)
)
given in
the statement of the lemma is indeed a ǫ−equilibrium . This completes the proof of the lemma.
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